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1ABSTRACT
The Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) has, as a Mayan
organization in modern, mestizo Mexico, challenged the epistemological hegemony of
modernity, from its own location and history, including both centuries of Western
economic domination and a wealth of organizing experiences over the past thirty years.
This provides an important reference point for ‘cross-border, cross-movement’
initiatives, appearing since the middle of the 1990s, that struggle against increasing
capitalist domination around the globe and which contain within them diverse
cosmovisions. These new spaces provide a possible location for confronting the modern
epistemology and the global domination that it justifies.
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11. INTRODUCTION*
This paper seeks to provide relevant information and suggestions to political
organizers working on ‘cross-border cross-movement’ initiatives, particularly those
directed against the increasing dominance of neo-classical economic policies and the
expansion of capitalist control over lives and livelihoods, as well as those which search
to construct futures which are independent of this control. In the process of writing and
exploration, I have become more firmly convinced that the problems facing
international organizers are deeply interrelated with problems of how social movements
are studied and interpreted which reflects broader problems within Western social
sciences.
Recent initiatives in ‘cross-border’, ‘cross-movement’ organizing have run into
the issue of differing ‘worldviews’ or epistemologies and have either ignored or only
perfunctorily engaged it.  This is, largely, the same response given to epistemological
difference by those who study social movements.  The result is that the epistemology of
modernity continues to be hegemonic, reproducing the dominant relations of power,
both in the social sciences and in the ‘movements’.
I consider this hegemony to be problematic for three reasons. First of all, the
promise of ‘modernity’, and ‘modernization’, have been used to legitimate the
expropriation of colonial, and later Third World, material resources since the middle of
the nineteenth century, by capitalist (and state socialist) world powers. They have
played an especially powerful role since the Second World War, when the new,
‘independent’ nations would (supposedly) be able to choose their own destinies.
Secondly, I find many limitations to the way that modern society is organized;
limitations which are traceable to the epistemological foundations upon which modern
thinking is constructed, some of which are discussed in the second section.  This
criticism is based on my own experience of growing up and living in the US as a boy
and later man, and of living and working in the Highlands of Guatemala for eight years.
This latter experience has made me aware that other epistemes  have their strengths and
weaknesses, as does the modern one.
Through the spread of capitalism and the modern state, the modern
epistemology becomes dominant, changing and destroying others in its wake.
                                                
* This Working Paper is a shortened version of my Master’s Thesis (Pollack 1998).
2Historically, this type of occurrence is not unique to the relationship between modern
and non-modern1 epistemologies but, in my own (normative) view, that does not justify
it.
And lastly, from the point of view of someone who is critical of ‘modernity’, the
disappearance of other epistemological frameworks implies a reduction in the
possibility of finding solutions to the problems promoted by modern ones.2  Assuming
that some of the problems of the modern world are rooted in its epistemology, it is at
this level that changes may need to occur. This type of change will probably not be
produced from within the modern episteme, and is more likely to be the result of
interaction with others.
There are then two struggles that must be waged simultaneously. One struggle is
that of the many struggles, of people fighting for their present and future in a myriad of
manners. The second is to open up the modern epistemology to the recognition of other
ways of understanding and interpreting the world, the struggle to create, as the Zapatista
Army of National Liberation (EZLN) has termed it, ‘a world in which many worlds fit’.
In practice the two are often intertwined in local struggles which challenge social
constructions and institutions that serve to hide exploitation, racism, gender inequalities
and other systemic practices of social injustice.  Their joining is also becoming relevant,
on an international level, through some of the ‘cross-border cross-movement’ initiatives
discussed in the final section.
I have chosen to analyze in depth the particular history of the EZLN for two
reasons. Firstly, because it has been able to combine these two struggles in a very public
manner, clearly and repeatedly engaging the Mexican government in ways that give
importance to a Mayan cosmovisión, relating it directly to the material needs of the
EZLN membership and the Mexican people.  Secondly, within the EZLN itself, because
                                                
1The use of the term non-modern should not be understood to mean a single category, in the sense that all
epistemologies that are not modern are ‘the same’ and classifiable as ‘non-modern’. I would like, rather,
to point out the variety among them rather than their similarities. At the same time, ‘non-modern’ should
not be understood to mean having never had contact with modernity, nor even having been unaffected by
it. There are obviously many situations where  boundaries between modern and non-modern
epistemologies are difficult to define and I am using the term as a type of shorthand to imply that the
epistemology under discussion is not primarily modern in its make up.
2There is increasing interest, particularly among environmentalists, and others, toward  non-modern
understandings. There is a history within the modern world of looking outward toward other societies, but
these initiatives have often disappeared, usually after having been accused of ‘romanticization’,
‘mysticism’, etc., in short, heretical of modern understandings. See Nandy (1992: 268).
3of its specific history, there is a tolerance for pluralism and, most importantly, a
recognition by the ‘modern’ members of the organization of the validity of the Mayan
epistemology as a means of interpreting the world. This particular point is of great
relevance for future international organizing that would attempt to avoid reproducing
systems of dominance in which non-modern epistemes are devalued or ignored.
In the universities, the location within modernity responsible for the continued
intellectual legitimization3 of modern epistemological hegemony, the process of
interrelating the two struggles is less advanced, partially because the discussion of
‘post-modernism’ and postmodernity has been such that the ‘non-modern’ (the ‘other’,
or perhaps that part of the self, that is outside of modernity) seems to have been
forgotten. Even among those who have rejected modernity as a universal goal, there is
an assumption that somehow modern thinking transforms other worldviews that it
touches into itself, as if once having come into contact with modernity, all non-modern
forms lose their specificity and become uniformly modern. At the same time, some
postmodern writing has made all understanding (including that of suffering and
struggle) sufficiently relativized that the role of the intellectual in relation to these
realities has been dismissed.  The difficulties within the academy are also affected by
the hesitancy of Marxist scholars (the intellectuals who have traditionally taken stances
in support of various popular struggles) to recognize as legitimate those struggles which
do not fit into the modern categories, pushed forward by actors who refuse to identify
themselves as ‘peasants’ or ‘workers’.
This paper attempts to make a move toward reintegrating the university into
these issues through a discussion of the relationship between popular struggle and
epistemological hegemony.  If interpretations continue to be monopolized by the
modern episteme, then domination of the non-modern by the modern will continue to
be justified in the name of ‘development’, ‘growth’, etc. In this regard, intellectuals
have a key role to play, if they choose to accept it.
                                                
3See Bourdieu (1985)  particularly his discussions of ‘cultural capital’ and ‘symbolic capital’, Bourdieu &
Passeron (1990: esp. 196-7)  and Spivak (1988)
42. GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING
From development to free market
Three key strands were woven together, albeit inconsistently, after the Second
World War, both in the  decolonization and ‘development’ processes of the Third
World and the reconstruction and welfarist policies of the First. These strands reflect
the dominant ideas and forces within the US and Western Europe during this period:
the pursuit and implementation of formal, liberal democracy; the nexus between
national and international capital; and the state-as-provider/organizer.4 While these
strands were brought into a comfortable arrangement that lasted from shortly after
W.W.II until the mid-1970s, since that time the state has lost its role as provider, and its
role as ‘organizer’ has consequently shifted toward that of the ‘night watchman’,
assuring only the frameworks necessary for efficient capitalist production.5 Since the
1980s, when Eastern European countries began receiving International Monetary Fund
(IMF) guaranteed loans (Chossudovsky 1991: 2533-4), and increasing dramatically
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the ex-Second World, under the tutelage of the
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), finds itself confronted with the same three
strands of post-war liberalism.  Thus, at present, provisions that were previously
provided by the state have been drastically cut, particularly in the Second and Third
Worlds, and often franchised out to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).
Since the late 1960s, improved technological efficiency, the movement of
industries from the old industrial core of the North to other parts of the world, and the
increasing speed of transactions on the international capital and financial markets have
                                                
4The idea of the State as provider/organizer was almost a universal between 1945-1975 in the
‘Communist World’ as well. Formal, liberal democracy has been more of a goal than a reality, initially
promoted in the Third World in the 1950s, it has returned, as a prinicple in the 90s. The relationship
between national and international capital has had a key role all the way through, but with  the end of
Keynesian policies, beginning in the early 1970s, the strength of international (particularly financial)
capital increased relative to that of  national capital (and labor) in First World countries (Gill 1990: 112-
4).
5Although IMF and World Bank (WB) policies in the early 1980s nearly ignored the role of the  state, in
the late 1980s they changed, defining the state as necessary to maintain an administrative framework
around which the market could work, and the political stability necessary for it to do so (See Drainville
1995: 65-67; Nelson (1996:627-630). These corresponded to attempts by the IMF to ‘bring some of the
poor (and the not so poor) into coalitions...broad enough to provide sustained support for adjustment
policies’ (Polak 1991: note 31 p. 7-8 cited in Drainville 1995: 67).
5all been features of a major shift in the world economic system. This shift has been
termed the ‘global restructuring’6 of the world ‘economy’7
The motor for this process has been a powerful capitalist sector, increasingly
international in its makeup, that has succeeded over the past 25 years in  battering down
national controls on domestic economies and in providing themselves with a liberty of
movement and of action heretofore unseen. These changes have been made possible
through  state participation in international agreements such as the General Agreements
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), in supranational institutions such as the IMF, the World
Bank (WB) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as national legislation
(particularly donor country policies). As First World states, particularly the US, force
through international agreements which increase corporate power,8 they create the
conditions which promote global restructuring.  Yet this process, only possible through
direct state involvement, is often publicly presented as an inevitable outcome, rather
than the result of inter-state negotiations and discussion (McMichael 1996a: 38).
This restructuring comes on the heels of the post-war period of massive
capitalist expansion in the context of state guided or directed economies which
promoted universal ‘modernization’.  Both Keynesian and state socialist economic
thinking supported nation-state guidance or direction of capitalist development and,
with the support of  the expanding academic disciplines of ‘development economics’
and later ‘development studies’, these paradigms were implemented in almost all states
of the world.
Since the 1970s, ‘[c]apitalism has slipped the fragile leash won through
centuries of struggle in national contexts’ (PGA 1998: 12-3). The move toward neo-
classical economic thinking (neo-liberalism) has meant an end to the role of the state as
provider, and a consequent shift in the modernizing vision that had underpinned
‘development’.  While some theorists have claimed that neo-classical economics is the
most ‘efficient’ way of providing public services, the change in this direction has meant
                                                
6The restructuring here refers to the changes underway since the mid-1970s toward a ‘free’ market. The
global economic crisis occurring as I write this paper is speeding up a different  restructuring of the
financial markets that began after the crash of the Mexican Peso in December 1994 (McMichael 1996a:
45).
7 Most discussions of the ‘economy’ are limited to monetary transactions in the ‘formal’ sector. This
isolates a particular type of ‘exchange’ from all others, and at the same time disembeds ‘economics’ from
the social relations in which it occurs. See Polanyi 1992 [1957], Granovetter (1992)
8See Stichele (1997: 6) and (1998:8)
6that the provision of services through ‘welfarist’ and state socialist policies are no
longer held up as models for the Third World to emulate.  The ‘promise’ of modernity,
understood as the provision of material well-being for all, made possible through state
guidance over, or direction of, capitalist industrialization, and preferably accompanied
by some degree of political freedom, is no longer a goal of ‘development’.
This change  has been forced from above by Western powers and especially the
US, leaving the young (and not so young), Southern states very much weakened.
‘Development’, the dominant ideology on a  global level since the Second World War,
and an often very fragile conception of ‘nationhood’,  have been the key legitimating
factors for many states since their creation (Nandy 1992: 268-9).  As a move into
modernity (development)  is no longer understood as improving material well-being,
but rather in terms of national integration into the global market economy (World Bank
1980 cited in McMichael 1996a: 33),  the institutions, processes and ideological
banners associated with it are increasingly being questioned and are losing their
legitimacy in many Third World countries.
The restructuring of the global economy has meant a loss of power for nation-
states, as what had previously been national decisions are increasingly made by IFIs and
major donor countries (Kothari 1995). It has also promoted a withdrawal of the state
from the provision of social services and  of support for domestic economies, provoking
radical changes in social structures which had been built around such state support,
causing untold suffering while new forms of social organization are constructed (or
not).
Economic marginalization has been the source of many types of social
movement organizing. These efforts are sometimes new, but are often continuations of
previous struggles. All of them occur in a context where the promise of Western
modernity is weakened and in which non-modern epistemological frameworks are
potentially given more credence by this loss of legitimacy. Nonetheless, many of the
movements, even those whose rhetoric may eschew Western modernity, continue to
struggle for some or all of its goals, while others choose different paths.
7Social and political consequences
Marginalization
The implementation of neoliberal policies has created increasing
marginalization around the world, expressed both through increasing differentiation
between rich and poor countries, and between rich and poor people in any given
country, North and South. Marginalization has been recognized by the WTO (Stichele
1997: 8), the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for  Economic
Co-Operation and Development (DAC/OECD 1996: 1)  as well as by the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP 1998: 2). In general, these institutions would
define marginalization in a way that corresponds to the definition of ‘expulsion’ which
is described below, and would assume that lack of participation in the global economy
is, by definition, a negative thing.
There are two types of marginalization that have occurred with global
restructuring: the expulsion from the ‘formal’ economy and state services on one hand
and the destruction of non-capitalist forms of social organization on the other, pushing
groups from situations of  ‘relative autonomy’ into ones of marginalization. This latter
process is not new to the present era of economic restructuring and is, effectively, the
history of capitalist expansion itself (Luxemburg 1968: 416).
In those Third World states that have undergone structural adjustment programs
(SAPs), marginalization has meant a reduction in access to services previously
provided, or heavily subsidized, by the state such as health care, education, urban
transportation, price controls on basic foods, guaranteed prices for primary products,
etc. The elimination of state support for these different parts of  life, necessary for daily
survival,  has meant that social relationships have been rearranged so that daily life can
continue forward. Initial responses to these shocks in many parts of the world are often
‘IMF riots’ in which the policies of that institution are directly brought into question by
popular protest (Chossudovsky 1991; McMichael 1996b: 129).
Reduced state funding for public services also provokes job loss or salary
reduction for functionaries,  weakening support for governments among the middle
classes. Some state employees  have been able to move into the (relatively well paid)
NGO sector as a means of augmenting or replacing lost income but, as university and
secondary school graduates discover that their skills are not employable,  they swell the
8ranks of an increasingly dislocated middle class9. The lack of employment opportunities
for those trained through Western educational systems reveals that this education is
only usable in the context of a modernizing state and capitalist expansion.  Their skills
are often not relevant (or at least difficult to apply) to the efforts and struggles of people
and communities to better their lives unless these efforts coincide with capitalist
investment or state planned modernization.
The reduction in state provision of support has been yet more drastic in Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union, combining with falling wages and increasing
unemployment to create massive increases in poverty levels over the past 10 years
(Charkiewicz 1998: 15-21; UNDP 1997: 79-80). The present situation in Russia, where
bartering is an increasingly common form of exchange, where 75% of agricultural
products for consumption are imported, and where unpaid backwages as of September
1998 equaled 27% of the GNP, is just the latest and most extreme crisis (Clairmont
1999).
In the First World, where some version of the welfare state has been in place
during most of the post-war period, the state has been consistently moving away from
the provision of services over the past two decades. Led by Reagan and Thatcher
(though initiated by Carter and Callaghan [Gill 1990: 100]) spending cuts have
provoked increasing levels of inequality in many of these countries (UNDP 1997: 82)10.
At the same time  improved technology and the movement of industry to countries with
lower labor costs has caused an increase in rates of unemployment, at a postwar high in
a number of Northern countries (UNDP 1997: 78).
In many parts of the world, state-sponsored development projects or continued
capitalist expansion have resulted in massive displacements of peoples and destruction
of their livelihoods (Rich 1994: 155-160). In some of these cases, the groups had
previously been ignored by the state and by capitalist enterprise and in others some type
of relationship may have already been established. In any event the state or capitalist
expansion pushes people, and social systems, from a position of ‘relative autonomy’ to
one of  ‘marginalization’. Marginalization refers to ejection or exclusion from a form
of social organization while autonomy, here, means the ability of a specific social
                                                
9 See Hoogvelt (1997: 198) regarding how this situation affects the Islamist movements.  See also Esteva
& Prakesh (1998:141-2)
10See also UNDP (1998: 27)
9formation to choose or influence its relationships with others. Though autonomy is
always relative, forms of social organization are more autonomous when they have
control over their own livelihoods (control over the means of production); this is
equally true for indigenous groups as it is for a nation-state.
The problem of capitalist expansion and massive state projects is not unique to
neoliberal global restructuring and has been very common throughout the development
era (Sanderson 1993).  Nonetheless, structural adjustment programs often reduce state
‘regulation’ on capitalist expansion while, at the same time, promoting the ‘mining’ of
natural resources by Third World countries as a means of earning valuable foreign
exchange necessary for debt repayment (Santos 1995: 313-4).  Both of these often
promote  outmigration, the entrance of local populations into  wage labor systems, and
ecological damage.
The movement from relative autonomy into ‘marginalization’ has often been
repeated in the history of  capitalist growth, but the movement out of systems of state
support and protection, however limited those may be, is perhaps a unique phenomena
to the present era. It is these two categories of ‘marginalized’ people who make up the
bodies of the larger social movements presently active around the globe.  The ways in
which these people mobilize, however, depend upon the specific history of the region
and the particular way in which restructuring is implemented in that region.11
Political weakening of the nation-state
Global restructuring has made the nation-state, particularly in the Third World,
into a ‘transmission belt from the world economy to the domestic economy’ (Cox 1992:
144). This  new role has also been accompanied by an increasingly repressive function
which has become necessary to combat social unrest resulting from cutbacks in social
sector spending (Chossudovsky 1991: 2533).
Repression occurs at the same time that ‘democratization’ is being celebrated in
Eastern Europe and Latin America as well as forced on Africa. ‘Democratization’ in
this sense is understood to be the creation of state level liberal democratic political
systems in which governments are chosen through free and fair elections (Baylies 1995;
Carothers 1995). In a nutshell, foreign donors and the IFIs are promoting the creation of
10
‘liberal democracies’ to run governments that are charged with implementing policies
created by the same IFIs.
This (rather absurd) situation is recognized by many grassroots organizations as
well as larger social movements, resulting in two different, though sometimes
compatible, strategies which are also relatively new, particularly in comparison to the
state-centered focus of many social movements over the past half century: initiatives for
local political and economic control, relatively free of governmental interference; and
more recent attempts at international organizing against neoliberal policies.12
Other movements demand that the state act to fulfill the responsibilities that it
had (in theory or in practice) under the ‘development state’, or try to win control of  the
state (through arms or elections) so that they can do it themselves (Petras 1997;
Veltmeyer 1997). Generally speaking, whether these movements describe themselves as
Communist, religious or ‘ethnic’, any hopes they may have of  rearranging the national
economy are limited by the heavily indebted nature of most Third World nations and
their dependence on outside investment.  While national governments can and do make
a difference in the living situations of their citizens, binding ties to foreign investors
and multilateral lenders make these differences relative. Attempts at weakening or
severing those ties risk economic isolation which, by provoking domestic hardship,  are
also likely to result in loss of political legitimacy.
After restructuring
The changes in the global economy, beginning in the late 1960s with the
economic slowdown of the postwar ‘golden years’, the structural changes put into place
during the 1970s, and the  eventual dominance of the neoliberal economic paradigm by
the late 1980s and 90s, have brought in their wake massive changes in social structures
in many parts of the world.  The East Asian, Russian, and Brazilian economic collapses
are promoting a quick rethink on the part of economists about trying once again to bring
the global economy under some type of regulatory control (Sachs 1998).
On the ground level, the responses to the various crises promoted since the
beginning of global restructuring in the 1970s are infinite in nature and represent
                                                                                                                                 
11See Pollack (1998:  Chapter 3) for my own attempts at understanding religious, ‘ethnic’, and
‘livelihood’ movements around the world.
12See Brecher & Costello (1994);  Danaher (1994); Lynch (1998); Roberts (1998); De Angelis (1998).
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creative responses to difficult situations. These responses meld with other trends
already present in different societies prior to neoliberal restructuring and draw on long
local histories which stretch back into colonial, and pre-colonial times. The failure of
the state-centered, modernizing system to allow for stable livelihoods for the ‘social
majorities’13 is pushing many to look into other forms of social organization that
attempt to work on a local level, and to reconsider the role of the state, as well as that of
the global economy.  In many cases, this rethinking takes place outside of modern
understandings of politics, but are nonetheless interpreted by social scientists and by
political organizers from within the modern14 perspective. This practice is based on the
assumption that the modern episteme can correctly interpret  all actions, even those
made by people who do not share the epistemological framework in which modernity is
embedded.
The sheer dominance of the modern epistemology, both in the corridors of
power and the corridors of  opposition creates two grave problems for those would seek
to struggle against continued neoliberal restructuring. Firstly, for those on the ‘Left’, it
becomes impossible to develop egalitarian alliances with groups which do not share the
modern epistemological framework, because their analysis  and projections are
immediately discarded.  Secondly, the possibility for modern thinkers to learn from
other epistemological frameworks is lost. As a result, political projects are restricted by
the modern epistemology, one which offers as many pitfalls as advantages.
3. THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL HEGEMONY OF MODERNITY15
'Life itself appears only as a means to life.'
Karl Marx16
                                                
13Esteva & Prakesh (1998) use the terms ‘social majorities’ and ‘social minorities’ to try and negotiate the
difficulties involved in discussing the ‘North in the South and the South in the North’. ‘Social majorities’
refers, generally, refers to the poor of the world, while ‘social minorities’ refers to the rich. Though the
terms cannot fully come to terms with the complexity of the situation, they are useful categories.
14Regarding ‘postmodernism’, I recognize that there is an increasing tendency for deeper criticism of
modern thinking than there has been in the past, but this trait has long been present in the West (inter alia
Thomas Mann’s The Magic Mountain originally published in 1924). It is a welcome criticism, but it
seems impossible to understand it as not just another permutation of modern thinking. In any event, the
differences between it and ‘modernism’ are minimal relative to the  differences between these two (taken
as a whole) and non-modern forms of thought. At the same time, post-modern self-criticisms (should)
allow new spaces for non-modern thinking to be weighed with more seriousness.
15This section reflects the influences of many authors including, but not limited to, Esteva & Prakesh
(1998), Santos (1995), Giddens (1971), Pateman (1988).
12
'Where the state is the only environment in which men can live communal lives, they
inevitably lose contact, become detached and thus society disintegrates.'
Emile Durkheim17
'Man is dominated by acquisition as the purpose of his life: acquisition is no longer a
means to the end of satisfying his material needs. This reversal of what we might call
the 'natural' situation, completely senseless from an unprejudiced standpoint, is
evidently as definitely a leading principle of capitalism as it is foreign to all peoples not
under capitalistic influence.'  
Max Weber18
I use the term ‘epistemological hegemony of modernity’ to describe an attempt
at clarifying the relationship between what might be termed ‘cultural imperialism’ and
global systems of accumulation.  By focusing the discussion on ‘modernity' rather than
on 'the West' I want to highlight the fact that in the West as well, the modern episteme
is hegemonic, but not universal. It should also be made clear that in centers of power,
outside the West, the same episteme is, largely, the dominant one.  Through a
discussion of ‘epistemological differences’ (perhaps not the most adequate term, though
I fail to find a more appropriate one) I wish to highlight the profundity of the
divergences between various ways of knowing, and the importance of these differences
for politics, economics, culture, social organization etc. My goal in this endeavor is to
recognize that ‘differences’ are not superficial, superstructural, nor inevitably doomed
to disappear into the modern episteme.  Through an excavation of these non-modern
epistemes, it may be possible to find new ways forward that are not structured around
modern institutions and processes.
The political dominance of the West has promoted the hegemony of the modern
episteme, legitimating the destruction of non-modern forms of social organization
through ‘modernization’ and the promised benefits of modernity. The appropriate
means indicated to arrive at this end have been the nation-state and capitalism, which
have served, inter alia, to simplify accumulation in the North.
My own sense is that the modern episteme has its positive aspects, as well as its
flaws, and there is no reason to assume that it is a universal good. Historically, a
judgment would require not only a critical look at the horrors of life in the modernized
world, but also a careful analysis of that part of the world that has been subject to it.
                                                                                                                                 
16Marx (1971: 101).
17Durkheim (1964: 28-29)  cited in Giddens (1971: 104).
18Weber (1920-1 v. 1:44) cited in Giddens (1971: 126).
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I share with many modern thinkers a desire for material well-being, for a fair
distribution of both power and of goods, and I would support those who fight for those
things.  Those goals are not unique to modernity, however,  and in order to struggle for
them, it is not necessary for actors to identify with the processes and institutions19
associated with it.
Modernity
In this discussion, I use the term 'modernity' as a reference both to a period of
Western history, extending from c. 1800 to the present, and the economic system,
culture, social relations, and epistemology that have developed during that period in the
West and since spread to other parts of the world.  In this description of 'modernity',
these various pieces (economy, social relations, culture, epistemology) form an organic
whole, and are not separable from one another. There is no pride of place given to one
or another of them.
My goal in defining 'modernity' is not to trace it back through history to
‘enlightenment thinking'  nor the traditions and ideas of Christianity, as that has been
done elsewhere (Latouche 1996, Salomon 1995), but rather to discuss some of its key
features as it has developed over the past two centuries.  The majority of this section
refers to the West during  the 19th and 20th centuries, a period in which many modern
processes and institutions were spread more consistently in the geographic space of the
West and were internalized into the knowledge base of individuals and society as a
whole. I recognize that it is impossible to understand the growth of modernity in the
West without contextualizing it in the West's relationships with other parts of the
world, but space will not permit such a detailed analysis.  Nonetheless, there is some
discussion about the expansion of modern processes, institutions and epistemology
outside of the West.
I will discuss modernity by describing some of the processes which I consider to
be its key features, trying to show how these have interacted over the past two hundred
years, focusing principally on 19th and 20th century Europe and North America, as they
                                                
19See Pollack (1998: Chapter 2) for an account of modernity which discusses some of its principal
instutions (agricultural and industrial capitalism, the nation-state, the nuclear family, and the social
sciences), as well as the processes discussed here below.
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changed from agriculturally oriented rural societies to more urban ones, with ever
increasing capitalist industrial production.
I make my own analysis, inevitably, from a modern perspective, that is to say
from within modernity, and I draw on much of the same social scientific writing that
has defined and legitimated modernity. There is a tension here which I find revealing in
the sense that the same authors who have studied modernity, from within, have
provided ample bases for criticizing it. What I do in this section is just to eliminate the
supposition that modernity is inevitable or necessarily desirable. In the present global
context, the negation of this  assumption is relevant for many who have been pushed
out of non-modern forms of societal organization, only to find themselves excluded
from modern ones. It is also relevant for those who are frustrated with the modern
world, who recognize its limitations and are searching for other forms of organizing
society.
Individualization, ‘secularization’, and rationalization are processes that
continue as modern institutions expand both in terms of their geographical influence
and in terms of their penetration into the ‘lifeworld’.  They are also characteristics of
modernity and can at times be used as indicators  which measure its spread and
influence.
Individualization20
Both Marx and Durkheim recognized, with consternation, that modern society
was developing in a way such that the broad scope of human relationships was
becoming increasingly defined solely by the economic aspects of social interactions.
Both authors saw this process leading toward increased ‘individualization’, a significant
and negative change. Durkheim considered the problem to be of a 'moral' and not
economic nature, and described it in terms of anomie, a problem created by societal
changes occurring too rapidly and not permitting the creation of corresponding
collective social values.  Marx focused on the impoverishment of the worker’s ‘inner
life’ (Marx 1971:96), the original alienation of the individual from his own self,
experienced through the alienation of his labor,  one of the ramifications of which is the
alienation of the individual from others (Marx 1971: 103).
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By focusing on the individual and the worsening quality of his or her relations
with others, both of these modern writers betray one of the epistemological bases that
modernity shares with Christianity: the possibility of conceptually separating the
individual from his or her relationships; the possibility of isolation. This had already
been mapped out in the Christian tradition which identified the soul of the individual as
a candidate (or predestined) for heaven:  'for the Christian, virtue and piety do not
consist in material procedures, but in interior states of the soul' (Durkheim 1969: 323
cited in Giddens 1971: 115-6).
The process of individualization, brought forward by the new economic
relations, as Marx and Durkheim noted, was accompanied by the construction of a
‘secular’ philosophy and legal system which  reflected this change.  In the liberal (and
Rousseauian) contractarian tradition, the individual was released from his or her
previously ascribed status and  made 'free' to enter into the various contracts (labor,
social, marriage) that still provide the legal definitions of  the relationships between
individuals in the three principal institutions of modernity: the state, the market and the
nuclear family.  The change from ascribed status to  that of the 'free' individual was
legitimated by the concept of abstract 'rights' possessed by all (though  originally only
property-holding men).  These rights are based on an imagined equality of condition
among all individuals which supposedly exists prior to entry into the various contracts,
and whose falsity has been criticized on class, gender and ‘racial’ grounds (Pateman
1988, Fraser & Gordon 1994).
As the individual was increasingly defined in abstract terms, she/he also became
universal both for liberals and for Marxists.21  By abstracting the individual, she/he
became decontextualized, allowing the image of the individual to become more
uniform. This universalization and uniformization is the negation of the differences
which are expressed in the various epistemologies that have existed throughout history
and which continue to exist today.
                                                                                                                                 
20Regarding individualization and the individual, see Caust (1992), Esteva & Prakesh (1998: Chapter 3),
Bourdieu (1996), Truong (1998).
21 ‘Though man is a unique individual...he is equally the whole, the ideal whole, the subjective existence
of society as thought and experienced’ (Marx & Engels 1956: 539 cited in Giddens 1971:13).
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'Secularization'
Modern thinking and the modern epistemology are considered to be  'secular'
because they are constructed on the belief in human rationality. The divine is to be
found in ‘rational’ thinking22 which excludes any understanding beyond the scope of
human reason. In this system, the  'invisible  hand of the market', the possibilities of
‘scientific socialism’, or the sanctity of 'human rights'23 can be  understood as ‘truths’,
similar to  religious dogmas.  The belief in any of these three ideas requires an
abstraction from historical and social realities: a leap of faith capable of ignoring the
fact that the applications of these rational construction bear fruit with little resemblance
to the abstract ideals that they represent. Nonetheless, because these beliefs are built
upon rational thought, they are considered to be secular. In the process, faith in abstract
rationality is hierarchically positioned above the concrete interactions of a ‘personal’
nature, and also above faith in abstract non-rationalities.
Tariq Banuri has described all societies as using two forms of 'knowledge', the
'personal' and the 'impersonal'. The 'personal' are those which are based upon the
intimate knowledge of a specific situation or person whereas the 'impersonal' are
abstracted forms which are applicable 'universally' (Banuri 1990). The modern episteme
proposes a way of knowing which puts the 'impersonal' into a hierarchical position
above the 'personal'. This hierarchization is reflected  in the modern public/private
division in the West24, the modern/traditional division between the 'West' and the 'Rest'
and, importantly, the marginalization of 'personal' ways of knowing, banishing them to
the netherworld of  the 'irrational'.  Banuri's insight provides us with a means of looking
at the modern/non-modern forms within the West (the heart of modernity), and also to
recognize that its 'rationality' (the impersonal knowledge that he refers to) is not foreign
to other epistemologies, but just given a higher status in the modern one.  In this way, a
critique of 'modernity' is not reduced to a critique of the West, nor does it eliminate the
                                                
22Thornstein Veblen sarcastically  described  the rational economic agent upon which  classical
economics is constructed as a ‘lightning calculator of pleasure and pains’ (Veblen 1980:73 cited in
Hodgson 1994: 61).
23See Santos 1995 (p. 329-337) for more on the history of human rights.
24 See below and  Pateman (1988), Fraser & Gordon (1994), and Vogel (1994) for more  on how the
creation of the abstract 'rights' in the 'public' sphere of the 19th C. resulted in the creation of a  'private'
sphere in which women and children were left with not only no 'rights', but also no recourse outside of the
family.
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rationalities of other epistemologies, and it also helps to explain how modern
epistemological frameworks, strengthened  by modern institutions (the nation-state,
industrial and agricultural capitalism, the nuclear family, the social sciences), can seep
so easily into, or on top of, others.
All three of the ‘faiths’ mentioned above reflect the ‘religion of progress’, a
belief in the ever-improving condition of humanity, that became part of the
epistemological foundation of modern thought in the middle of the 19th century.
Salomon (1995) saw in this ‘religion’, and the social movements that it spawned,  new
means of arriving at the Christian heaven, a version of which could now be constructed
on earth.
The addition of the evolutionary perspective in the late 19th century brought
more strength to the 'religion of progress'. Even prior to Darwinism, humanistic modern
thinkers were clear in their goal of harnessing technology in order to create a better
world for all.  The evolutionary model led many to assume that modernity (and now
postmodernity?) has been the ongoing endpoint of a single history of humanity. This
assumption, combined with the ever expansive appetite of capitalism (or perhaps the
other way around), would later give rise to ideas such as 'the white man's burden' and
the 'modernization' theory of development whose expressed goal of remaking the Third
World in the image of the West remains the principal one in the development discourse
of today, though ideas about how to achieve it have changed over time.
It is the definition of modernity, by modern thinkers,  as ‘secular' that lays out
its strongest claim to epistemological hegemony.  Because it is based on a belief in
'rationality' (a form of knowledge understood to be superior to both the non-secular and
the ‘personal’), modernity can coexist with, and/or  be imposed upon, other
epistemologies. Following along the lines of  its Christian precursor, modernity is
universal:  just as Christianity was able to subsume into itself the earlier religious
traditions of Europe and the Americas, modernity claims the capacity to swallow whole
all the religions and epistemologies of the world, which become, in the most recent
understandings, ‘cultural differences’.
Rationalization
The application of ‘rational’ thinking,  mentioned above, is intimately related to
the technology that would allow for the rationalization of capitalist production which
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permitted and promoted a utilization of resources more efficient for the increased
accumulation of capital. The same ‘impersonal’ forms of organization were used in the
expansion of already existing state bureaucracies and professional armies, contributing,
in turn, to the rationalization of Western societies. The rationalization of both the state
and the market allowed for the increasing abstraction of the person into the 'worker' or
'citizen', in this way promoting the parallel process of individualization. This trend has
accelerated during the twentieth century with the increasing importance of another
descriptive category, the 'consumer', whose individual tastes and desires are created,
and catered to, by the market. In the First World of the 20th century, the role of the
‘worker’ has diminished in importance relative to that of ‘citizen’ and  the ‘consumer’,
corresponding to the changes in the global economy which increasingly define the role
of the First World as that of consumer for the global market, reflected in the rise of the
‘service sector’ in those countries.
The ever-increasing rationalization of the market and the state, and their
increasing penetration into daily life in the 'modern world' has been described by
Habermas as the 'colonization of the life-world' (Habermas 1989). The increasing
provision of 'goods' and 'services' by the market and the state, through their rational and
efficient systems, reduces human relationships into recreational contacts, ungrounded in
the various tasks (reduced to the categories of production, reproduction and
consumption) which make up life.  This tendency is reinforced by post-Fordist systems
of production and distribution (service sector) which reduce the consistent and
continued relationships between workers in the factory to temporary and
inconsequential contacts between acquaintances.
The modern epistemology
Why epistemology
I have described modernity's chokehold on the world as 'epistemological
hegemony'.  By bringing modernity down to a level where it sits among many epistemes
and  where it has no hierarchical superiority, I want to give equal weight to the
innumerable other ways of knowing. I am using epistemology to mean 'cosmovisión',
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Weltanschauung or worldview25,  a claim to the basis for the production of knowledge.
In this way I hope to give equal weight to the knowledge claims of the Mayans of what
is now Chiapas, the College of Cardinals, the Dalai Lama or the Board of Directors of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In this way I am calling, on a political level, for
these claims to be recognized.
It is not sufficient to see a society in terms of its clothing, foods, ceremonies etc.
as if these were all trappings or superstructure built upon an essentially common 'human
nature'.  By recognizing that different forms of social organization have different
epistemologies26, I want to emphasize the profound differences in the ways of
perceiving, interpreting and understanding the world that are related to different claims
regarding how knowledge is produced. These different claims have many and  varied
implications for the different ‘spheres’ of life (economic, social, cultural, etc.) into
which modern thinking divides the world.
If these differences are not recognized in international organizing, and the
modern epistemology is assumed to be universal, there are two principal risks. One is
that international struggles will be for uniform rationalization, individualization and
‘secularization’ around the globe. The second is that the various struggles around the
world could be weakened by the potential incapacity for groups and movements to
forgo ‘epistemological prejudices’ among themselves.
Implications of the modern epistemology
Yo no lloraba cuando se me morían los bebés. Ahora las mamás lloran, mi hija está
llorando por su nena. Ahora hay que hacer algo para que los niños sobrevivan.
[I didn’t cry when my babies died. Nowadays mothers cry, my daughter is crying for
her baby girl. Nowadays things must be done so that the children survive].
Comments made by a Mayan, Guatemalan midwife, about her daughter’s mourning (in
Piazza 1995: 9).
                                                
25These terms are not truly interchangeable. ‘Cosmovisión’ or ‘worldview’ represent whole, organic
understandings of the ‘universe’,  inside of which the claims for the basis of knowledge coexist with
knowledge itself and the material world to which this knowledge refers. While originally used to describe
the ‘world view’ of the German people at the end of the 19th century, Dilthey interpreted
‘Weltanschauung’ to describe  the type of rapport with the world that is developed during a specific
historical epoch. ‘Epistemology’ refers specifically to claims for the basis of production of knowledge
which are separate from knowledge itself and the world in which it is situated.
The term epistemology corresponds to only one part of ‘cosmovisión’, Weltanschauung, and worldview,
each of which is not separable into distinct pieces, of which  ‘epistemology’ is interpreted to be one by
modernity. By focusing on ‘epistemology’, I draw attention to the claims upon which the modern
‘cosmovisión’ understands its own foundations to be constructed.
26This is not to say that epistemologies are constructed from material relations of production but that the
two are unavoidably related, but not causally linked.
20
Thus far I have identified two epistemological bases of modernity: the concept
of the isolated individual and ‘progress’. These bases are not unique to modernity, but
nor are they universal. The implications of assuming their universality are profound,
however, especially because, through social policies and planning27, the
epistemological beliefs of the group which does the planning can affect the beliefs of
those who are planned for, or around.
Modern social systems, like industrial systems, are now carefully designed by
planners and, in these systems, the isolated individual is the target of policy. This means
that provision of ‘care’ for the aged, children, the sick is based upon the idea that as
long as the material needs of that person are met, ‘care’ has been provided. What would
be called the emotional or psychological needs of the individual, which exist only  in the
relationships between people, are easily ignored by systems that see only ‘individuals’
and ‘material needs’(Young 1990: 25).  The relatively recent recognition of this
problem in the West has given rise to a set of paid ‘experts’ (as well as unpaid
volunteers) who provide human relationships for those that the ‘complex society’ has
left isolated.
Attempts at imposing modern social policies on non-modern forms of social
organization result either in epistemological shifts within the ‘object’ populations,  a
rejection of them, or their reinterpretation.  ‘Modernization’ theories of development
attempted to impose changes in the social structure that would weaken the social bonds
that previously held societies together. The modernization theorists had recognized that
‘development’ (i.e. the path to Western modernity) would be impossible if accumulated
capital was distributed through social networks. To put it in other terms, capitalist
growth is based on the possibility for individuals to ignore the suffering of their fellows.
After capitalist expansion occurs and non-capitalist forms of social organization are
destroyed, new forms of social organization are created, either by the state through
social planning, or without the state, through autonomous reconstruction, or through
                                                
27Social planning began in 19th c. Europe as a response to the social unrest brought forth by uncontrolled
industrialization and urbanization (Escobar 1992). The growth of social planning was closely linked to
the expansion of the social sciences and the struggle for control over definitions over  the ‘rational’
organization of society (Rueschemeyer and Skocpol: 1996). It also had the function of ‘normalizing’ (i.e.
promoting the bourgeious values and lifestyles of the time to) the working classes in the industrial centers
and was applied for the same reasons at around the same time in the colonies (See Nandy 1983: 4-6 et
passim and Horne 1998).
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some combination of the two.
The need for wage labor, and later for capitalist agricultural systems, both in
Europe and ‘the colonies’,  has destroyed or unalterably modified other forms of
societal organization (Polanyi 1944: 163-165) and, in the process, changed the
epistemologies of those societies. Because human societies are organic wholes, in
which the material, the spiritual, and  the epistemological are all interrelated, the change
in economic and social organization necessarily implies a change in epistemology as
well.  These changes are often abrupt and definitive, leading Santos (1995: 345) to
make the comment ‘that [c]ultural imperialism and epistemicide are part of the
historical trajectory of Western modernity.’
‘Global restructuring’ and epistemological change.
Epistemological changes are not unique to the modern era nor to capitalist
interchanges with non-capitalist societies. The notable feature about the continued
‘epistemicides’ perpetrated by modernity is that they tend toward a universalization of
the epistemological bases of modernity in a hegemonic role.  This ‘funneling’ of
‘cosmovisions’ into a single form of thinking (modernity) was accelerated by the
growth of the ‘development state’ in the 1950s-70s.
The change from the ‘development state’ to  an increasingly single integrated
market over the past 20 years brought with it important implications for the continued
dominance of modernity.  While the presence of state services during the ‘development
era’ brought with it modern epistemological frameworks, the retraction of the state in
the 1980s and 90s has meant the marginalization of many people(s) from both state
services and modern epistemologies. This has implied the reconstruction of old
epistemological frameworks as well as the construction of completely new ones.
The hegemony of modernity
We build your penitentiaries, we build your schools
Brainwash education, that makes us the fools…
    (Bob Marley 'Crazy Baldheads')
This may be the historical moment when Western ethnocentrism could begin to admit
that other human worlds are possible - we are not locked in to a ‘logic of development’
of either the liberal or Marxist varieties.
 (Schroyer 1991 : 75)
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The hegemony of modernity can be described as existing in two overlapping
spheres, the political-economic and the epistemological.
Modernity and political consent
Hegemony, following Gramsci, is  the capacity of the ruling classes (or an
adversarial class) to establish or maintain its control over state power through coercion
and the creation of consent among the ruled by means of education, use of  the
communications media, etc. (Gramsci 1971: 80 note 49).  In this sense, the ‘promise’ of
modernity, and especially of modernization ('development') has been the principal
means of obtaining consent from the ruled, particularly (but certainly not only) in the
Third World, and above all in recently decolonized (created) states. In the many cases
where consent has been lacking, nation-states have been quite willing to use coercion as
well, and often with international support.  Nation-state legitimacy (not of the
government, but of the state and the 'nation' itself) has often  been based on the twin
pillars of  the 'development' project and on a generally weak sense of nationalism, with
the threat, or active use, of repression usually present.
The legitimacy that ‘development’ has provided to these states and their
governments must be addressed, not only in terms of the posturing of national leaders,
but also in terms of the desire for ‘development’ that this represents.  The 'promise' of
modernity is one that appeals to many  people, not because it has been forced upon
them, but because the material benefits and ‘political freedom’ enjoyed by many who
inhabit the 'modern' world  (especially as they are presented) are very appealing. It
would be an oversimplification, therefore, to pretend that this desire is only felt by
those who have been displaced from other systems of social organization and who find
themselves excluded from the modern project, though this is also a common
occurrence.
But desire for material well-being and political freedom  should not be confused
with a desire for 'modernity'. ‘Modernity’ has as much to do with impoverishment and
tyranny as it does with material well-being and political freedom. It would, in fact, be
difficult to disassociate the growth of these modern ‘achievements’ from their flip-sides
in many parts of the Third World, and the First.
Dignity, a concept which encompasses both material well-being and political
freedom (in the sense of being able to participate in decisions about the future) is not a
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modern concept, and it defies ‘rationalization’. Perhaps it is dignity, which modernity
seems to offer to its members28, that is so appealing to those who are excluded from it.
In this way, modernity is presented as a means of achieving dignity and, more
importantly, is presented as the only alternative to ‘traditional’ forms of social
organization, as if imagining a distinct future were impossible.
Epistemological hegemony
Through colonization and the development state, the belief in modernity has
become universalized to such a degree that it has an operative hegemony on the
epistemological level. The level of hegemony of the modern epistemology is
comparable to the hegemony of Christianity in Europe, and later in the Americas, prior
to the Enlightenment. During this period, social criticism, moral discussion, etc. could
only be framed within the dominant discourse of Christianity.  It was unthinkable that a
questioning of the social order or philosophy could be developed  from any other
source. Hence, questions were phrased within the Christian discourse, and even those
who criticized from within were often labeled heretics. During the 16th and 17th
century, efforts were made by a number of Catholic missionaries to protect and defend
the indigenous peoples of Latin America from what they perceived as the abuses of the
Spanish colonial system. These efforts were necessarily made through claims situated
within the epistemological framework of the Catholic Church, even though it was that
same Church that legitimated the colonization of the Americas (See Piazza 1992) and
the forced labor of the indigenous peoples (See Ricard 1966; Phelan 1970).
In a parallel manner, indigenous people are now defended by 'human rights' (a
modern doctrine) from capitalist expansion and ‘development’, that is to say, from
modernity itself.  Much in the same way that the Catholic doctrines used to defend
indigenous people under colonial rule were little known to them, the human rights
doctrine used to defend them now may be equally obscure, and its origin is equally
                                                
28 The following quote from a Mexican newspaper during the ‘First Encounter Against Neoliberalism and
for Humanity’ is revealing on this point. “Surprised, [Comandante David] explained that some
participants from the “First World say that their problems are worse than our own problems here in
Mexico.  There is violence, grave injustices.  Even though they don’t know poverty and don’t know what
it means to be lacking economically; they have a complete lack of dignity.  They say that here, among the
indigenous people, although there is material poverty, we have a richness of humanity and dignity.it is a
great challenge to save that richness in all senses. Those of us who still have that consciousness have the
big job of humanizing that large part of society that has become dehumanized”  (Pérez & Enríquez 1996)
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foreign.  In both cases, the counterhegemonic discourse is framed within the hegemonic
epistemology in order that it be heard.  But the use of this counterhegemonic discourse
not only empowers  the hegemonic epistemology by legitimizing it; at the same time it
weakens the claims of alternative epistemologies and undermines their position in
‘global’ discussion, reducing their strength at a local level, as the power of the
dominant epistemology is reinforced.
There is a historic tendency toward increasing inclusiveness in the ‘rights’
discussion, depending on broader trends in Western thinking. ‘Civil rights’ of the
eighteenth century were expanded to include  ‘political rights’ in the nineteenth century
and ‘social rights’ in the twentieth (Marshall 1964: 74).  Recently, as ‘cultural’ issues
have become an issue, arguments for the inclusion of ‘collective rights’ into the liberal
paradigm have begun to appear.
The aim of liberals should not be to dissolve non-liberal nations, but rather to seek to
liberalize them.  This may not always be possible....To assume that any culture is
inherently illiberal, and incapable of reform is ethnocentric and ahistorical. (Kymlicka
1995: 94 in Thompson 1997: 788)
This comment, aside from its own extreme ethnocentrism, is interesting because it
seeks to broaden the ‘rights’ discourse while ‘social rights’ are being massively reduced
through the implementation of neoliberal economic policies throughout the world.
The international acceptance of human rights is reflective of two different, but
related, currents. In the first place, their acceptance, by states (whose degree of
representative legitimacy is certainly questionable) is not due to the ‘universality’ of the
concept, so much as to the  epistemological hegemony of modernity. The second,
equally important reason for the acceptance of human rights, is their utility for
opposition groups.  An appeal to the respect for human rights is a means of securing
Western support for these opposition groups, or at least for their right to act.  Whether
or not these groups actually share a belief in the sanctity of human rights is irrelevant to
their use as a political strategy (Esteva & Prakesh 1998: Chapter 4), underlining once
again the dominance of Western, liberal discourse at the level of international relations.
Just as ‘human rights’ is used in many parts of the world, ‘environmentalism’,
‘civil society’, and ‘democratization’ can also be used by local activists to find external
support for their struggles.  While these are the catchwords of the 1990s that will allow
for Western support, through NGOs, donor governments or IFIs, their use by
organizations in the Third World (or even in the First) does not imply that the words are
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accepted by them, or interpreted by them in the same manner.  This is reflected in the
way that the catchword of ‘socialism’ has often been  used in revolutionary  struggles
by nationalist and other groups whose goals may or may not have coincided with those
of the foreign governments or solidarity groups that supported them.
The power of epistemological hegemony is reflected in the fact that organized
opposition to capitalism, the primary locus of modern expansion, has traditionally come
from within the modern camp, socialism29. Other forms of resistance have tended to
either be isolated or to make some sort of compromise with (modern) socialism.  The
problem with this is that socialism, as it is commonly espoused, presupposes
modernization.  It is an attempt at making a complex, capitalist society into a social
whole (Polanyi 1944: 234). Its application to non-modern societies is just as much of an
imposition as capitalist modernization.
Now, political opposition can be found using the terminology of human rights,
democracy, and even environmentalism. The framing of these opposition struggles in
the ‘globalized localisms’30 which originate in modern thinking serves once again to
weaken non-modern epistemological frameworks.
Mapping modernity
The expansion of modernity's hegemony is now at (although perhaps it has
passed) its historic high point.  It is still unclear whether the global recession, ongoing
since the 1970s, but now approaching global crisis proportions, and the end of the
'development state', have slowed, permanently disabled or redirected the course of
modernity.  It is clear, however, that the neoliberal  ‘globalization’ which continues to
promote 'modernity' in the form  of capitalism, pseudo-liberal democratic governments,
and coercive state apparatuses, without providing for the material well-being of
‘citizens’, promotes a myriad of non-modern responses, largely because modernity as
epistemology has not been internalized by most people, particularly those living in the
Third World.
                                                
29It can also be argued that ‘socialism’ as such predates modernity as in the often termed ‘utopian’
writings of Thomas More, Campanella etc. See Laidlaw (1948) for more on this history.
30Santos (1995: 263) describes globalized localism as ‘the process by which  a given  local phenomenon
is successfully  globalized’ and localized globalism as ‘the specific impact of transnational practices and
imperatives on local conditions that are thereby destructured and restructured  in order to respond to
transnational imperatives.’
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A map of modernity in the world might look like three concentric circles. In the
center circle would be those areas in which modernity is the clearly dominant
epistemology. These would include almost all of the First World as well as most of the
upper and middle classes of the Third World, Eastern Europe and the ex-Soviet Union.
These people are economically secure (though this security is certainly decreasing) and,
for the most part, epistemologically modern in their outlook. At the same time,
relationships outside of the 'contracted' public sphere still exist, and the Western
feminist epistemological claim to 'difference' may well be grounded in the experience
of 'caring', of a not-only-rational perspective on the world.
Many of those in this category are likely to be involved in social movements
which have been identified as ‘advocacy networks’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Smith et
al. 1997) such as environmentalism, human rights advocacy, the peace movement, and
the anti-nuclear movement. Some sectors of this group would also tend toward
autonomous movements (Katsiafacas 1997) or become involved in the various
‘grupuscules’ that the radical Western Left has shrunk into.  The membership of trade
unions in the First World, as well as some parts of the Third, would also be located in
this circle. In their positions regarding modernity, these groups are likely to fall
somewhere in a spectrum between, on one end, a desire for modernity’s continued
expansion through ever increasing consumption and, on the other, a relatively radical
reform of modernity that would involve reorganization of production and consumption
patterns, as well as possible moves toward more participatory forms of democracy.
There are also many attempts at constructions of new economic and social systems
which, as of yet, have remained at a local level.
The vast majority of the world lives in the middle circle. It includes the
populations of the continually expanding Third World cities and most of those living in
rural areas. New members of this group are the majority of the populations in Eastern
Europe and the Ex-Soviet Union. These people have  stronger or weaker links to the
capitalist economy and their national states. This circle also includes Third World
immigrants to First World countries, and others in the First World who are increasingly
excluded from many of the material benefits of capitalist modernity. In general, these
people have suffered deteriorating material conditions over the past twenty years,
putting them into positions of  near permanent economic insecurity.  Modernity for
these groups may be at once a fractured history and a dream of the future.
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In terms of social movements, these groups are choosing two principal
strategies. One is to demand that the state assure them material well-being and (at
times) political freedom (essentially that social democracy be returned, implemented or
expanded; i.e. that a social contract be respected). The legitimization provided for the
state need not be limited to modern ones: religious and ‘ethnic’ movements or
governments that can offer the same results are gladly welcomed. The second strategy is
to construct new livelihoods through the ‘informal’ sector, through repeasantization, or
some combination of the two (Burbach 1998; Gibson-Graham 1995; Petras 1997). The
divisions of the modern world into ‘production’, ‘reproduction’ and ‘consumption’ lose
their rigidity as the ‘personal’ interacts more fluidly with the ‘impersonal’.  These
strategies often overlap as people pressure the state for whatever they can, while at the
same time building their own livelihoods.
The outer circle is now very small and includes those forms of social
organization that have had little contact with modernity.  These are the few remaining
indigenous groups only recently brought into more demanding relationships with the
modern world through its expansion into previously isolated areas of the Amazon,
Borneo, etc. These groups have the greatest degree of epistemological autonomy from
modernity. Recently, they are finding success in social movement organizing around
indigenous issues, springing initially from defensive actions to protect livelihoods but,
in the process, bringing forward critical questions about the epistemological bases of
modernity, particularly of the nation-state (Santos 1995: 313-327). They have had a
very positive response  on an international level, both from other indigenous groups
(Wilmer 1993) and from those in the first  ‘circle’ mentioned above (Santos 1995: 323-
4).
The presence of modernity through these three circles can be measured  through
the degree of expansion of wage labor and state power, the latter in regard to both
control and surveillance as well as in the provision of  health, education and other social
services.  With the present retraction of state service provision, the promise of
modernity ceases to function as a legitimating force for the nation-state.  This loss of
legitimacy brings forward a number of new and old forms of resistance and
construction that may use modern discourse to pursue non-modern goals, or non-
modern discourse to pursue modern ones.
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4. WHEN DIVERSITY MEANS SOMETHING: THE ZAPATISTA ARMY OF
NATIONAL LIBERATION AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL STRUGGLE
They also told us that they were studying hard what dignity is, that they are doing
research and studies on dignity. What they could most understand was that dignity was
service to others. And they asked us to tell them what dignity means to us. We
answered them that they should go on with their research. It makes us laugh, and we
laughed in their faces.
(Comandante Tacho’s comments on a conversation with government representatives
about the EZLN demands that their dignity be respected.)31
On January 1, 1994, the date that the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) went into effect, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN), in what
might be called a suicide mission, declared war on the Mexican Federal Army and
occupied four cities in the southern Mexican State of Chiapas. Twelve days later the
Mexican government called a unilateral cease-fire and the war turned into a low-
intensity conflict with all of the accompanying details: government supported
paramilitary groups, massacre, thousands of displaced persons and the militarization of
the state.
The rebellion, a challenge to the neoliberal restructuring which has
impoverished much of Mexico and the rest of the world, has made the
devastatingeffects of the present political/economic order that much more visible for
those who choose to see them. The demands and the practice of the EZLN focus not
only on economic injustice, however, but also on epistemological difference and its
political implications.  While these two aspects of the Zapatista struggle are not always
equally emphasized, they are nonetheless always present. The EZLN distinguishes itself
from most other movements because it chooses neither an exclusive and inward looking
version of a religious, national or ‘ethnic’ identity, nor an imagined ‘progressive’
movement of modern (Marxist-Leninist, liberal, etc.) origins.
The EZLN is an army and a movement whose roots and history, like any other
movement, are specific to the location which has seen it grow and evolve: the jungles
and highlands of Chiapas, Mexico, Planet Earth32, locations which force a recognition
of the interrelatedness of the local, national and global levels. The indigenous
campesinos, who make up the vast majority of the movement, are as much a product of
European history as Europeans are products of theirs.  Though the ‘political’ control of
                                                
31Cited in Rabasa (1997: 414) taken from the Mexican Daily, La Jornada 10 June, 1995.
32This location is a  common address for EZLN communiqués.
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Spain over Chiapas ended in 1821, the economic relations that have bound Chiapas to
the rest of the world, and the rest of the world to Chiapas, are stronger than ever. The
cheap coffee enjoyed in the West is the product of Chiapaneco (and many other)
campesinos’ careful planting and picking, often under exploitative conditions. That
same coffee also provides jobs in Northern supermarkets, advertising agencies, the
stock market, etc. as well as profits for multinationals. For every $1.00 in coffee
revenues that stays in Third World countries (somewhere between 25 and 50 cents
actually going to the producer), another $9.00 goes to the First (Chossudovsky 1997:
88).
Just as the global economy is nothing new to Chiapas, neither is protest and
rebellion, occurring periodically  through colonial times and continuing after
independence (Bricker 1989: 111-140, 235-248). This history has arrived at another
‘active’ phase in  the last 30 years with a great deal of religious, indigenous and
campesino organizing, the most visible manifestation at present being the EZLN.
Unlike many other movements, armed and unarmed, the EZLN position, in
addition to the social and economic revindications which form the backbone of its
demands, also questions some of the basic ideas regarding the  distribution of political
power within a nation-state and, more broadly,  the political implications of ‘diversity’
at the level of epistemology or cosmovision. In the Mexican case, the power differential
between the dominant and the dominated can only be understood in reference to the
relative importance given in public discussion to the epistemological differences of the
indigenous and mestizos. The negation and denial of the indigenous cosmovision, not
only by those who oppose them, but also by those who would help them (be they
Maoists, priests or state officials), has meant that all debate has taken place on the terms
defined by the dominant groups.
This denial has also meant that the various ideological debates both between
liberals and Marxists, as well as within the ‘Left’ are of secondary importance for the
Mayans themselves (See Rabasa 1997: 420). The history and struggle of the Mayans in
Chiapas goes back further than these differences of opinion between the ‘kaxlanes’33
                                                
33‘Kaxlan’ is a Mayan term for the Ladino/criollo/Spanish ‘other’. The term ‘Criollo’ was originally a
colonial term that referred to Spaniards born in the colonies. ‘Ladino’ is a term used in Chiapas and
Central America, often loosely equated with mestizo, meaning mixed-blood, used in most of Mexico and
Latin America. The terms are not interchangeable and their different usage also reflects the ways that
race, class and gender are structured in different Latin American societies (Piazza n.d.).
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and, in many senses, regardless of which camp might gain the upper hand in the
struggle, their own voices would be ignored. An important aspect of the Zapatista
rebellion is that it has allowed these epistemological differences, as well as their
political implications, to be openly voiced and to be heard outside of the indigenous
communities.
From a perspective which sees the modern episteme as, at the very least,
problematic, a political force such as the EZLN which actively questions it, and does so
within a discourse of social justice (or at times of an isomorphic non-modern one), is an
important actor to watch, and reflect upon, as the Left goes ambling confusedly into the
twenty-first century, seemingly trapped in modernity34 and unable (or unwilling) to look
outside of it35.  In this regard, the EZLN has successfully made contact with a number
of other political actors in Mexico and around the globe (through the use of internet and
email), gaining politically important support from many organizations, while
simultaneously promoting and participating in new national and global
networks/alliances/encounters.
Historical background
The most important features of the history of Chiapas have been relatively
consistent since the Spaniards invaded the area in 1524. Struggles over land and labor
have historically been intertwined with the deeply rooted racism of  Chiapas society36.
The present ‘racial’ boundary between ‘Indigenas’ and ‘Ladinos’ is a somewhat
transformed version of the Indian / Spaniard boundary of the early colonial period.
Economic and political power in Chiapas passed from the Spaniards to the Criollos to
the Ladinos37 of today, the class division almost always corresponding to the ‘racial’
one and backed up by violence whenever necessary (González Casanova 1996: 285).
The struggle of the Mayans in Chiapas against the Ladino landowners and the Mexican
                                                
34Whatever changes may have occurred in  the past thirty years, the Left is tied to the institutions and the
philosophical constructs of modernity: the nation-state, the isolated individual, progress, industrial
society,  a single and universal rationality etc. It is often also unwilling to see that Northern societies have
constructed, and depend on, a global system in which the few benefit from the poverty and the oppression
of the many.
35The recognition by Wallerstein (1996) of the philosophical biases of any ‘rationality’ might provide a
point of departure, from which other categories can begin to be reevaluated.
36See Colby & Van den Berghe (1961), regarding Mayans and Ladinos in Chiapas. See Paz (1996) and
Centro de Derechos ... (1996) for more on the Mayan interpretation of history in Chiapas. See also
González Casanova (1996: 285).
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State has been against the privilege of race and class (inevitably interrelated with gender
issues) in a context of continued colonialism and coupled with waves of capitalist
expansion.38
From invasion to revolution39
During much of the colonial period, when Chiapas formed part of the Audiencia
of Guatemala, the Mayan towns of the central highlands provided a source of forced
labor for the successive waves of plantations in the coastal areas of Chiapas
(Soconusco), working whatever crops were earning money on the national or
international market (Macleod 1980: 192).  In other areas, to the north and east of the
highlands, large haciendas were established by private citizens or clerical orders
(Wasserstrom 1983: 38-42), some of the former remaining more or less intact to the
present day, with little change in terms of the oppressive nature of relations between
Ladino owners and Mayan workers.40 Late in the 17th century, the indigenous
population of Chiapas (as in the rest of the Americas) was drastically diminished by the
entrance of Old World diseases combined with the Spaniards’ exploitation of local
labor. Partially in response to the vastly diminished populations, the Spaniards created
(as in the rest of the Americas) ‘reducciones’,  centralized towns which ‘reduced’ the
widely scattered populations into a single space. The Spaniards justified the
reducciones with the argument that Christianizing the population would be made easier
if settlements were more closely observed, though they also facilitated the collection of
tribute, in  labor or goods, and simplified political control.
Under late 18th c., Bourbon rule, with the first signs of the oncoming liberal
order both in Europe and the New World, the San Cristóbal élite began purchasing
                                                                                                                                 
37See note 33 regarding Criollos and Ladinos.
38Jeremy Beckett (1996: 6) makes the following insightful comment: ‘Capitalism, while relentlessly
expansionary and transformative in the long haul, cannot in any case be understood as a steady
progression from simple to complex, or from isolation to incorporation or from autonomy to
subordination.  It is often better understood as a series of tidal motions, invading indigenous territory only
to recede, leaving the “natives” to pick up the pieces of their disrupted lives, before the next wave
breaks.’
39See Wasserstrom (1983) and Favre (1973) on  the history of Chiapas.
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indigenous lands, previously protected by the crown.  This trend would continue during
the whole of the 19th c., increasing notably in  the 1850s and 1860s when the Mexican
government, as well as the State of Chiapas, passed a number of new agrarian laws
intended to promote capitalist agriculture. These laws effectively allowed for all
unoccupied lands to be declared vacant and to be purchased from the state. In many
cases, claims were made on land used by indigenous communities with no legal
documentation to prove ownership, a theft that left many peasants landless and which
remains in the collective memory of many Chiapanecos (Paz 1996: 237-40).  The land
grab, and the forced labor that it permitted and promoted, reflected the expansion of
capitalist agriculture in Mexico (much of it for export to Atlantic markets),  which
reached its apogee under President Porfirio Díaz, eventually becoming one of the key
factors leading to the Mexican Revolution of 1910-191941.
From revolution to neoliberalism
The revolution continues in Mexican popular consciousness as perhaps the
defining event in Mexican history, largely because the Party of the Institutionalized
Revolution (PRI) that has been in power over the past 70 years continuously identifies
itself with it. The history of the revolution is a complex and confusing one (Gilly 1994;
Womack 1968), involving struggles within the Mexican élite, as well as peasant
grassroots mobilization, the latter providing both the military strength of the
revolutionaries, and the more radical ideas regarding land reform and the protection and
creation of communally owned agrarian communities, the ejidos.42
During the revolution, the Chiapaneco Ladino élite was able to unify and
militarily control the state, while the indigenous campesinos served in its armies. It was
this same Ladino élite who negotiated with other regional and national leaders at the
end of the fighting and  ‘[t]hus power and land in the state of Chiapas remained in the
same hands as before the revolution’(Paz 1996: 244).
                                                                                                                                 
40A sign in Lions Club in the eastern Chiapas town of Ocosingo in 1971 read: ‘In the Law of the Jungle it
is willed that Indians and blackbirds must be killed’ (Hernández Navarro 1994: 6-7 cited in Wager &
Schulz 1995: 4).
41The first  ‘military’ actions of Emiliano Zapata in 1910 were the protection of communal landholdings
from claims made by local sugar plantations (Womack 1968:64).
42Ejidos are communally owned plots of land that were distributed/returned to peasant and indigenous
communities as part of the land reform programs resulting from the Mexican revolution.
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Though the constitution of 1919 established both protection for communal land
holdings and agrarian reform, only under the government of Lázaro Cárdenas in the
1930s did peasants began gaining access to land. Cárdenas’ land reform program
formed part of a larger national strategy of development that was devised under the
realities of global depression. The limited export possibilities to Europe and the US
meant that nationally led economic growth through industrialization became a
politically feasible alternative (Collier 1994: 31-2). The plan was based on the
redistribution of land to the campesinos who, with the help of state extension workers,
would produce surplus grains on their ejidos that could keep wage costs low for
industrial workers in the cities. Decent prices for the campesinos would allow them to
purchase the domestically produced industrial goods.
The effects of the revolution (usually equated with the effective implementation
of Cardenist policies) are considered to have never taken hold in Chiapas, which is true
to the degree that the land reform program was weakly implemented there in
comparison with other parts of the country. Because they were usually able to retain the
capital improvements on their plantations, as well as the best land, those large
landowners subject to expropriation often continued earning profits, at the expense of
the ejido holders, through the processing or resale of coffee grown on their former land
(Wasserstrom 1983: 164).  Land redistribution, where it did occur, was in areas
peripheral to the central highlands including the northern and eastern parts of the state,
taking place principally during the 1940s and 1950s, in part promoting the colonization
and migration to the east that had already begun in the 1930s (Favre 1984: 89-92).
The PRI under Cárdenas developed a corporatist political strategy based on
direct relationships between the state and organizations of peasants, workers, urban
groups and indigenous people, in this way strengthening the federal government and
weakening the regional élite. Power was thus consolidated in a party-state system that
continued to function through clientelist practices43 until the shifts to neoliberal policy
after 1982 began to weaken its foundations. In the Highland communities, the
indigenous leaders developed direct contacts with the federal government, bypassing
the traditionally dominant Chiapas Ladino élite (Rus 1994).
                                                
43This ‘standard’ interpretation of Mexican history has been questioned by Knight (1996) and Rubin
(1990) who see the Mexican state as less than monolithic,  rather a coalition of regional forces, each of
which maintains a certain degree of power.
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The National Indianist Institute (INI) played an important role in the highland
communities from the 50s through the 80s. Working toward the inclusion of the
indigenous populations into Mexican society, the INI was institutionally trapped, and
divided, between a desire to recognize cultural differences while simultaneously
promoting a single national identity (Rus 1994). Like other state bureaucracies, the
INI44 acted as a mechanism of co-optation by the state and a conduit to resources for
selected groups.  In Chiapas it worked closely with the PRI-affiliated indigenous
community leaders, often disagreeing with state level authorities. Initial work in the
provision of health services, education, and some legal services, as well as the creation
of cooperatives, the purchase of community trucks, etc. was dropped, following
national policy changes, in favor of promoting capitalist enterprises (Rus 1994: 289).
The cooperatives were privatized, falling into the hands of individual community
leaders, promoting a new class differentiation within the communities that grew over
time and created divisions that would eventually play a role in the indigenous
mobilizations of the 1980s and 90s.
In the oil (and borrowing) boom of the 1970s, sparked by the flush of petro-
dollars, the Mexican government constructed large hydroelectric plants, oilfields and
highways. These projects offered work to the indigenous people of Chiapas, resulting in
two significant long-term consequences. One was increased income disparity within the
communities and the second, after the boom, was a large number of unemployed
campesinos flooding the job market, pushing rural wages downward (Collier 1994: 94-
106).
Increasing economic inequality within the highland communities provoked or
exacerbated a trend in which leaders ceased taking responsibility for the community as
a whole, and began acting on behalf of the small groups of the economically well-off
whose interests they shared.  One aspect of the change was a move from a system in
which ‘economic relations were almost always subsumed in social ties’ to one where
the two were increasingly unrelated (Collier 1994:122): the disembedding of the
economic from the social that occurs in capitalist societies as described by Polanyi,
Marx and Durkheim. Social responses to the increasing marginalization and economic
stratification in the Highlands were expressed in conversion to Protestantism,
                                                
44For more on the  INI, see Favre (1971: 356-373) and Zea (1974).
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opposition political parties, and continued migration into eastern Chiapas. The
acceptance of the religious and political organizers described in the following sections
should be understood in the light of the newly forming social structures which the new
communities were constructing in a frontier zone where ideological and social
structures were few and weak.
Northeastern Chiapas 1960-199445
The different currents of religious and political organizing active in eastern
Chiapas, the heartland of the EZLN, all tended to focus on community decisionmaking,
a process which has at times also been common in the Mayan communities of the
region, though certainly receding over the past forty years.  The process of creation and
re-creation of ‘identities’ (Leyva & Ascencio 1996: 148-173) and of the community and
communal forms (Marcos & Le Bot 1997: 45-6) in eastern Chiapas can be followed
through the processes of colonization, religious organization and political organizing.46
The sheer diversity among the people living in eastern Chiapas, combined with that of
those who came to work with them for political or religious reasons, created a climate
in which relationships with the ‘other’ and openness toward unknown cosmovisions
were necessarily present, later informing the political initiatives of the Zapatistas on
both national and international levels.
Emigration, colonization, religious influences and the Indigenous Congress of 1974
Since the 1930s, migration into eastern Chiapas has been used as an ‘escape
valve’ by the Mexican government to decrease pressure for land reform.  The colonists
have come in waves, the majority from the nearby highlands though others from more
distant parts of Mexico, as well as a large influx of Guatemalan refugees in the early
                                                
45 This section is an abbreviated description of a complicated interlacing of peasant, religious, indigenous
and political organizing, and relies heavily on four principal texts: Collier (1994), Leyva & Ascencio
(1996), Marcos & Le Bot (1996), Obregón (1996).
46It is difficult to sufficiently disentangle the relationships between the different institutions and the
communities themselves in order to understand how much influence was held by different institutions. It
is impossible to comprehend these relationships without a recognition of racial differentiation in Mexico
that makes a clear dividing line between mestizo/Ladino and indigenous.  The concept of ‘community’,
can be understood as a collective actor that can be isolated from the Ladino institutions of which
community members may form a part. This understanding does not mean to imply that  the ‘community’
is impervious to the ideas promoted by other institutions, but recognizes the existence of a ‘Mayan’
community that maintains a distance from Ladino institutions.
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1980s, fleeing from a genocidal army on the other side of the border.  The population of
the area is mixed, the largest groups are the Tzeltales, Tzoltziles, Tojolobales and
Ch’oles though other Mayans, non-Mayan indigenous people, and some Ladinos are
also present (Leyva & Ascencio 1996: 50-51 et passim).  These communities in the
‘frontier’ areas of eastern Chiapas have developed with few, if any, government
services and under the effective control of the large ranchers whose decisions are
implemented by their hired guns, the ‘guardias blancas’ (white guards) (Obregón 1997:
162-170), creating  a climate of relative (if forced) self-sufficiency and a need for self-
protection (Leyva & Ascencio 113-4).
The newly colonized areas of eastern Chiapas were fertile ground for Protestant
missionaries who had been present in Chiapas since the turn of the century, but whose
first successes were precisely in these areas beginning in the 1950s. Many in the
highland communities began converting to the various Protestant sects in the 1970s,
interpretable as a response to the new class stratification and their political
ramifications discussed above (Collier 1994: 57). These groups often challenged the
dominant power structures of the communities and were marginalized by them, at times
to the point of physical expulsion; eastern Chiapas and suburbs of the nearby city of
San Cristóbal de las Casas were the preferred destinations.
The Protestant churches promoted an egalitarian form of services in which
women and children were encouraged to participate on equal footing with men. Literacy
training for women formed a part of their teachings, as well as the collective discussion
of bible passages among all of the faithful (Collier 1994: 58-60).  It would be
inappropriate to attribute to the Protestant churches the ideas regarding women which
appeared in the Women’s Laws declared by the EZLN at the time of the 1994 uprising
(EZLN 1995), but it would also be foolish to ignore their effect on the communities.
Since colonial times, the dominant religion in Chiapas has been a Catholicism
which in the indigenous communities is heavily influenced by Mayan religious/spiritual
beliefs and practices. Beginning in the early 1960s, the Catholic church, partially in
response to the Protestant expansion (Collier 1994: 62), began evangelizing anew in
Chiapas, later adopting liberation theology as it became popular throughout Latin
America later in the decade. The dioceses and its Bishop, Samuel Ruíz, put an emphasis
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on cultural issues, building an ‘Indigenous Church’ (Marcos & Le Bot 1997: 43) and
taking on an extremely important role in the communities.47
In the early 1970s the government of the State of Chiapas asked the Catholic
Church to organize an ‘Indigenous Congress’. The network of the Church in the
communities brought participants from more than one thousand communities to the
1974 event. For the first time in a meeting of this nature, the indigenous people of
Chiapas were able to set the agenda (land, education, health) rather than respond to one
previously set by the State. The frankness of the indigenous speakers surprised State
representatives, unaccustomed to hearing the problems of the indigenous people clearly
and publicly voiced. Additionally, a positive impression was made on the Mexican Left,
‘who saw in it an example of the viability of a real popular (grassroots) organization
integrated by communities of very different languages, ethnicities and cultural
identities’  (Obregón 1997: 173). Much of the organizing in the region since the
Congress has  been based on the Church network that had existed prior to the Congress
and the organizational system, created around the congress itself and maintained until
1977.
The indigenous campesino organization Quiptic Ta Lecubtesel Union de
Uniones (Union of Unions United by our Strength) was an early product of the network
formed at the Indigenous Congress. The ‘Quiptic’ was initially dedicated to defending
the ejidos of several communities, at that time under threat of relocation.  Over the next
two decades, it would play a key role in indigenous and peasant organizing in eastern
Chiapas: many conflicts between different ideological and strategic currents were
played out within  the organization itself (Leyva & Ascencio 1996: 148-173).
Campesino organizing
Two Maoist organizations, Union del Pueblo (UP) and Política Popular (PP)
appeared in eastern Chiapas in  the mid-1970s and fused shortly thereafter, maintaining
the name of the latter (Obregón 1997: 177). They consisted primarily of students who,
                                                
47 For more information on the role of the Catholic Church in Eastern Chiapas, see Leyva & Ascencio
(1996: esp. 148-173). The Church’s role varied from region to region, though certainly in this area, the
original base of support for many groups that would join the EZLN, the Church was extremely important.
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after the Tlatelolco48 massacre of 1968 had chosen to work on organizing directly with
‘the masses’. The Church had an important role in introducing these groups into the
region and into the Quiptic (Obregón 1997: 177; Collier 1994: 73-74), allowing them to
make use of the networks formed by the priests and catechists.  These organizations
worked toward a ‘bottom-up’ form of popular organizing that would give decision
making power to the community assemblies. Such forms were similar to the practices
used by the Catholic Church, and the Maoist organizations saw themselves as offering a
more directly political means of responding to the expectations raised by the priests and
catechists.  Church leaders recognized the same phenomena but felt that the
organizations that they had helped to build were being taken over by outsiders (Leyva &
Ascencio 1996: 165-6).  The competition between the Church and the leaders of
Política Popular would continue during the following decade.
In 1977, at about the same time that UP and PP appeared in Eastern Chiapas, the
Central Independiente de Obreros Agricolas y Campesinos (CIOAC) began organizing
in the northern part of the State.  Affiliated with the Mexican Communist Party, it
wanted to integrate the campesinos into the workers struggle and challenged the
government through federal labor laws (Collier 1994: 71) in order to gain land for
peasants, effectively avoiding the rather stagnant agrarian reform bureaucracy.
The Organización Campesina Emiliano Zapata (OCEZ)  was formed in 1982
through the initiative of the Coordinadora Nacional Plan de Ayala (CNPA), a national
coalition of independent peasant organizations officially founded in 1979. Involved in
direct action as well as legal battles for peasant access to land, OCEZ always
maintained a very aggressive attitude toward the Mexican government, and particularly
toward the government organized national peasant union (Confederación Nacional
Campesina [CNC]) (Collier 1994: 71).
The CIOAC and OCEZ began coordinating actions together such as road
closing and hunger strikes during the 1980s, working through legal channels to promote
peasant demands. By the end of the  decade the OCEZ, the CIOAC and the Quiptic
                                                
48In 1968 the student movement in Mexico planned to disrupt the upcoming Olympic Games to be held in
Mexico City.  At one of the preliminary rallies, the army opened fire on the students, killing hundreds.
After the massacre, organizing on the left moved toward three positions: active armed resistance;
attempting to reform the state; and mass, grassroots organizing.
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were organizing in increasingly overlapping zones in northern and eastern Chiapas
(Collier 1994: 76).
Military organization
Prior to the arrival of the EZLN in 1982, there was no discussion of military
organization among the different groups active in Chiapas. The EZLN formed part of
the Fuerzas de Liberación Nacional (FLN), a Guevarist Mexico City based
organization with a history stretching back to the early 1970s (Marcos & Le Bot 1997:
52). The small group of guerrillas who arrived in Chiapas from urban areas further
north initially expanded slowly, making contact with the local communities through the
provision of some basic health services and self defense training.
After briefly disputing a position of leadership within Quiptic in the 1980s, the
EZLN formed the Alianza Nacional Campesina Independiente Emiliano Zapata
(ANCIEZ) c. 1990, which was more active in the Northern part of the state and in the
Highlands (Marcos & Le Bot 1997: 54). This organization was joined by some
members of the OCEZ along with other independent peasant organizations, openly
promoting self-defense, and covertly discussing plans for an uprising (Marcos & Le Bot
1997: 54).  State repression against campesino and indigenous organizers in the area
had become fierce, resulting in many deaths. If the organizations were to continue to
struggle for land, ‘self-defense’ had become a necessity. The move toward choosing to
take up arms offensively  was another step, but by 1991, through their (continued)
presence within the Quiptic U.U. and the activities of the ANCIEZ, the EZLN bases
were present in the ‘hot spots’ of peasant protest in the state.
Economic and political pressures
The effects of the economic policies implemented after 1982, required by the
IMF as Mexico became the first victim of global economic restructuring, made visible
through the international debt crisis, were the key factors which led to the decision to
take up arms.  The changes in the Mexican economy spelled the demise of the PRI
corporatist state, sparking popular responses all over Mexico. State cutbacks
implemented through the restructuring policies proved especially lethal in Chiapas,
‘almost an internal colony for the rest of Mexico, providing oil, electricity, timber,
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cattle, corn, sugar, coffee, and beans, but receiving very little in return’(Collier 1994:
116).49
This restructuring included the suppression of state subsidies for coffee
producers in 1988 (Collier 1994: 106), followed up in 1989 by a massive drop in
international coffee prices provoked by US pressure at the International Coffee
Agreement meeting, negatively affecting small scale producers in northern and eastern
Chiapas.  After the drop in coffee prices came a reduction in cattle prices in 1992-3,
making it impossible for campesinos to repay loans outstanding from the late 1980s
(Leyva & Ascencio 1997: 177). Additionally, in 1989 the government of the state of
Chiapas, under pressure from national and international environmental groups ended
forest clearance in the Lacandón jungle, including clearance for crops, effectively
halting the expansion of areas under cultivation necessary for continued agricultural
production in a rainforest area (Leyva & Ascencio 1996: 177-8) and limiting another
possibility for campesino survival.
As a step toward entering NAFTA, in 1992 the PRI government reformed
Article 27 of the Mexican constitution, abolishing land reform and opening up the
communally owned ejidos for sale on the market, a move that may have provided the
primary motivating factor for rebellion (Obregón 1997: 186). These had been the
principal gains made by the Mexican revolution, and their ‘betrayal’ was seen as an
official policy of marginalization for many poor rural Mexicans, indigenous and
Ladinos alike. The land reform system had been functioning poorly for years, but the
possibility of having land to work (and the autonomy that implies for a campesino) was
at least a possible exit to an otherwise dire future.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s the economic factors described above, along
with the end of government sponsored development projects, weighed heavily on the
campesinos of Chiapas. The process of economic restructuring in Mexico eliminated
the possibility for the Mexican state to cushion these economic shifts. Campesino and
indigenous protest, active in the region for decades, was increasingly repressed by the
state and the private ‘white guards’. The electoral fraud of 1988, in which Cuauhtémoc
Cárdenas and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) lost the presidency of the
Republic through blatant fraud, eliminated any hope among the Chiapanecos for  the
                                                
49For detailed statistics on the levels of impoverishment in Chiapas, see Collier (1994: 16).
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possibility of political change through the electoral process (Obregón 1997: 184). These
factors made the EZLN proposal of armed struggle into a political option, if only
because there seemed to be no other.
Military action was only feasible because of the extensive organizational
structures already established through the various interactions between Mayan
campesinos and external actors over the years. However, it would not have been chosen
at that particular moment if it had not been for the economic and political crisis in
Chiapas50, resulting from the economic restructuring forced on the Mexican state after
it nearly defaulted on international loans in 1982. The EZLN uprising responded to
political/economic phenomena which were decided in stock markets in New York
(coffee and cattle prices) as well as boardrooms in Washington D.C. and Mexico City
(IMF terms for structural adjustment).
Epistemological struggle
The last 30 years of history in the Mayan communities of  Chiapas have been
marked by the entry of new actors on a stage which was  previously occupied almost
exclusively by the Mayans themselves, the Ladino élite and the Mexican state. These
new actors (Maoists, Guevarists, liberation theologists, Protestant preachers, campesino
organizers, and others) entered the communities to further their own causes which they
perceived to be the same as the indigenous campesinos. In almost all cases, these
organizations represented national or international (Church) organizations, and their
politics were closely linked to those larger groups. This is an obvious limitation of
alliances and of national organizations which also has its concomitant benefits.
Nonetheless, because of the discriminatory51 beliefs of Mexican society, many of their
efforts were built on intellectual constructions that allowed them to speak in the name
of the people they had gone to ‘help’. This represents, on a micro level, an historical
problem of the ‘Left’(among others), attempting to speak for people whose realities,
and therefore goals, it cannot fully grasp.
                                                
50Leyva & Ascencio (1997: 180) point out this combination of factors.
51In this case ‘discriminatory’ describes not only unfair treatment of indigenous people in ideally
egalitarian public spaces, but also the fact that the ‘public spaces’ themselves are defined by the dominant
epistemology, effectively forcing the indigenous people to play by a set of predefined rules which do not
necessarily correspond to their own. This is closely related to the argument put forward by Wendy Brown
(1993) regarding identity politics in the US.
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If the EZLN is to be celebrated (Rabasa 1997: 399) as an organization that
attempts to ‘learn' to speak to (rather than listen to or speak for) the historically muted
subject of the subaltern’ (Spivak 1988: 295 in Rabasa 1997: 399), its success must be
understood in terms of the history of interchange between subaltern and dominant
actors over the past thirty years. In this case ‘dominant’ refers to the organizations
mentioned above, organizations that, because they speak and act within the already
epistemologically defined political space dominated by mestizo modernity, maintain
both their relative power and their position as the ‘other’ for the Mayans of Chiapas. It
is nonetheless only through this history of interchange between the indigenous
campesinos and the mestizo organizations that a new political space has been created in
which the indigenous cosmovision can be expressed publicly. It is this cosmovision
which proposes the concept of ‘dignity’52, as discussed by Comandante Tacho in the
epigraph. Perhaps because dignity cannot be reduced to an abstract ‘rational’ definition,
it is only with difficulty that those who negotiate for it can be coopted, and perhaps for
this reason it has so confused the PRI.
Cosmovisions or epistemologies are inseparable from the economic, cultural,
social, psychological etc. realities in which we live and therefore contain within them
political implications. The Mayan cosmovision (like all non-modern ones) has never
been publicly discussed as anything but a  ‘pre-modern holdover’ or a subject for study
by anthropologists. Hence, since the Zapatistas began to appear publicly in 1994, they
have expressed themselves not only to voice their demands for changes in the structure
of the Mexican state, but also to verbalize the profundity of the epistemological
differences which separate them from  the philosophy in which  the Mexican state is
inscribed.53
The struggle for epistemological autonomy, or at least recognition, has been a
recent addition for the indigenous campesino movements of Chiapas. The Indigenous
Congress of 1974 has often been seen as an important take-off point for indigenous
organizing in Chiapas, both because it was a moment of interchange between different
groups from throughout the state, without government control, and because it allowed
                                                
52See Holloway (1997), De Angelis (1998), Rabasa (1997) and von Werlhof (1997) for more on the
EZLN and dignity.
53See von Werlhof (1997) for an attempt at understanding the use by the EZLN of such terms such as
‘dignity’, ‘politics’, ‘government’, etc.
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for new networks to be formed. In this Congress, however, the objectives presented
were not identifiably ‘indigenous’, but could have conceivably been proposed by any
peasant group (Collier 1994: 63). The lack of reference to specifically ‘indigenous’
issues in this case could be taken to imply that the ‘real’ interests of the indigenous
people of Chiapas are the same as all campesinos. A more appropriate explanation
could be that during the Indigenous Congress ‘difference’ was underplayed due to fears
that it would be rejected by the State and Church officials present who could have used
these expressions to discredit other demands, or weaken support for them.
The 1992 San Cristóbal protest of the quincentennial anniversary of the arrival
of the Spaniards in the New World made the shift toward a more openly ‘indigenous’
movement powerfully visible. The changes wrought in the movement over the previous
twenty years of intensive organizing were symbolically manifested by toppling a statue
of the Spanish conquistador Diego de Mazariegos (Collier 1994: 18). The international
advancement of indigenous movements, not least in neighboring Guatemala,
undoubtedly had an important impact on organizing in Chiapas.54
Within the EZLN itself, through 1992, control of the organization was officially
in the hands of the mestizo leadership of the FLN in Mexico City. Only in January of
1993, (a short three months after the San Cristóbal protest), the same time that the
decision was made to go to war, did the leadership of the organization move officially
under the control of the Clandestine Revolutionary Indigenous Committee (CCRI), a
body governed by  representatives of the four principal Mayan groups that make up the
EZLN (Marcos & Le Bot 1997:170-1).55
At the time of the uprising in 1994, the Zapatistas claimed the indigenous nature
of the movement (EZLN 1994), but did not assume the full epistemological
implications of that recognition until later. The Zapatistas claim that this postponement
was made in order to avoid having the movement pigeonholed by the Mexican State
and  people as ‘Indigenous’ and not representing broader, national problems (Marcos &
Le Bot 1997: 176-7).  It was only when the military situation had (seemingly)
stabilized, ‘civil society’ support for the Zapatistas established, and peace negotiations
                                                
54See Wilmer (1996); Santos (1995: 323-4) for more on the international indigenous movement.
55 Rabasa (1997: 417-8) argues that the accusation that the organization is run by Ladinos belies a racism
that does not allow for the idea that the Mayans could lead themselves.
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begun, that the Zapatistas would begin to publicly adopt a posture that expressed the
reality of the epistemological differences, not as unbridgeable chasms, but as realities
that must be recognized.
The Zapatista claim to a different cosmovision, part of organizing their lives and
social structure, has been expressed in many ways, most concretely in the negotiations
with the Mexican government on indigenous rights and culture in 1995-6 which
discussed autonomy for the indigenous people of Mexico. It is also expressed through
the phraseology used by the EZLN, much of it drawn from Mayan history and speech,
including repeated and public references to role of ‘the dead’ in communicating to the
living.56 This can be interpreted as the naïveté of ‘traditional cultures’, or a deliberate
questioning of the materialist exclusivity of modernity; appearing as it does in political
tracts, the latter seems more likely.
Another example is the presence of Commandante Trinidad, a sixty year old
Mayan woman, at the table with government negotiators during peace talks in 1995
(Rabasa 1997: 415). Introducing herself as a woman concerned for her ‘grandchildren
living under a state of siege in the rainforest’ (Nash 1997: 265) challenged the stuff of
modern peace negotiations, and brings the realities of ‘caring’ and of ‘relations’ into
what otherwise might be a discussion on ‘socio-economic issues’ or the ‘provision of
state services’. The age and gender of Comandante Trinidad brought into question
common understandings of leadership and representation, while her comments rejected
the abstraction of human realities, a fundamental epistemological base of the modern
cosmovision.
Perhaps the most important example of the EZLN questioning of modernity
comes from its insistence on diversity, on a future that is not one of homogenization
and uniformization. The implications of the EZLN positions are that ‘differences’
reflect the unified whole of social systems, irreducible into distinct ‘cultural’,
‘economic’ etc. spheres of life. This would mean that distinct cultures cannot and will
not perdure in a world where a single set of political and economic structures are
enforced. For the Zapatistas, this is not a question of ‘post-modernism’, but rather a
statement from the position of the colonized ‘other’ that does not wish to be made the
‘same’ as the rest, in this case part of ‘modern’ mestizo Mexico. The Zapatistas make
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this demand while not repudiating the Mexican State, their goal being to reorganize it in
such a way that the hyphens between nation and state continue to be undone (Spivak
1995: 91), toward the construction of a ‘civil’ rather than ‘national’ state. This is a
radical reconsideration, which questions constitutional frameworks that, however
‘inclusive’ they may be, are products of the modern cosmovision and therefore
politically exclude, at their source, other epistemological frameworks.57
Dreams, planning and strategies 1994-1999
The EZLN has cultivated its relationship with Mexican society as part of their
political strategy, both to create space for political change in Mexico and to protect
themselves from military repression. Immediately after the uprising in 1994, Mexican
society became involved in the struggle of the EZLN. It was the large public
mobilizations in Mexico, as well as internationally, coupled with the Mexican
government’s desire to avoid the international scandal of a bloodbath on the heels of the
country’s entry into both NAFTA and the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and
Development (OECD), which led President Salinas to proclaim a unilateral cease-fire
just 12 days after the uprising began. Massive popular protest, both in Mexico and
internationally (Wager & Schulz 1995: 34-5) would later stop a military offensive in
February of 199558. Similar actions slowed paramilitary violence in the spring of 1998
on the heals of the Acteal massacre in which  45 indigenous peasants were killed by
paramilitary forces while they prayed in their village church in  December of  1997.
Already in 1994, the EZLN began implementing the extremely creative political
initiatives which (while functioning poorly on the plane of traditional alliance politics
on the Mexican Left) have shined as examples of the possibilities for collective, non-
state organization that seeks to redefine the word ‘democracy’, taking it beyond
periodic visits to polling stations. That summer, the EZLN organized the National
Democratic Convention, hoping to create a broadbased alliance of the Mexican Left,
                                                                                                                                 
56For examples see Holloway (1997: 38), EZLN (1996:24) and for further discussion see von Werlhof
(1997: 118-120).
57See Santos (1995 esp. pp.325-327) for an enlightening discussion of similar subjects.
58The offensive of the Mexican Military in early February 1995, with arrest warrants for EZLN leaders, in
violation of a 1994 law protecting the Zapatistas during the peace negotiations, came on the heels of an
‘assessment’ released on Jan. 13 by the Emerging Markets' Group of the Chase Bank which stated that the
Mexican ‘government will need to eliminate the Zapatistas to demonstrate their effective control of the
national territory and of security policy.’ (Halimi 1995)
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drawing an impressive number of important organizations and participants, but failing
to create coordination on a national level.
In August of 1995 the Zapatistas organized a plebiscite which asked whether
they should become an unarmed political force in Mexican politics or should continue
as an armed movement, resulting in a short lived plan to leave the armed struggle in
favor of dialogue. Later that year, before a round of negotiations with the government at
what should have been the first of six discussion tables, the EZLN organized a set of
fifteen regional forums, with the participation of indigenous groups from throughout
Mexico followed by the national ‘Forum on Indigenous Rightsand Culture’ in January
1996. The conclusions were brought to the negotiating table on Indigenous Rights and
Culture the following month (Foley 1997:138). Unfortunately, the Mexican government
refused to accept the Accord on Indigenous Rights and Culture reached between the
EZLN  and the government negotiating team at San Andrés in 1996, and the dialogue
has since been ignored; low intensity warfare now the preferred policy. The most recent
plebiscite of March 21, 1999, asking, among other things, opinions on the negotiated
Accord three years after the government rejection, managed to gain the support of three
million Mexicans.
The international strategy of the EZLN has been similar: creating support while
promoting political discussion among diverse actors. Contacts were initially made
through already existing indigenous rights networks, human rights networks, Central
American and other solidarity networks, as well as, in North America, on the anti-
NAFTA organizing of the early 1990s. After the early mainstream press coverage of the
uprising, it was these networks, built principally upon email and the internet (Cleaver
1998;  Ronfelt & Martínez 1997), that kept information flowing and allowed for the
massive national and international responses to particular events discussed above.
In both the national and international contexts, the EZLN has catalyzed already
existing tensions and tendencies, attempting to create discussion and interchange. The
work within Mexico is the most important for the struggle of the EZLN, both in
Chiapas and on a national level, and it is here where the ideals of discussion,
interchange and coordination proposed by the EZLN are limited by its own
organizational weaknesses and the power and influence of the established political
actors on the Mexican Left. On an international level, the EZLN proposition, which
begins from a non-modern location, denying the universality and desirability of
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modernity, while making concrete proposals that bring together notions of social justice
with a recognition of epistemological  differences, is an important reference point for
those who are critical of both the social realities of modern societies (in the North or
elsewhere) and the global inequalities of which they form a part.
5. CROSS-BORDER, CROSS-MOVEMENT INITIATIVES IN THE LATE
1990S
Introduction
Born in the poverty and social destruction caused by the global economic
restructuring of the previous twenty years, beginning in the middle and late 1990s a
trend toward ‘cross-border, cross-movement’ organizing has become ever more visible.
Though the strongest active movements today, those described as religious or ‘ethnic’,
do not participate, these initiatives represent a new type of political action with
important implications.  They begin to break down the limits created by national
frontiers and to negotiate the boundaries between social movements that have
historically limited coordination among them.  Because many of the groups involved in
these initiatives do not share important features of the modern  Western cosmovision,
the existence of different worldviews must (or at least should) be confronted. In these
situations, the dominance, or hegemony, of the modern epistemology can be brought
into question, allowing for alternative visions of the future to be proposed.
These initiatives involve interchanges between, primarily, ‘advocacy
movements’ led by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), ‘livelihood
movements’59 and  some strands of organized labor, though many other organizations
and individuals find spaces within them. The principal reasons for this convergence are
the marginalization of much of the world population as a result of neoliberal global
restructuring; an increasing frustration on the part of many NGOs regarding their new
and contradictory roles; and the continued weak bargaining position of labor unions that
                                                
59 I use the term ‘livelihood movements’ to describe two different, but often related, phenomena: local
efforts to resist the expansion of capitalist  initiatives or state sponsored ‘development projects’ which
destroy local forms of economy (Taylor et al. 1993; Ekins 1992; Guha & Alier 1997: Chapter 1); and
efforts at construction or reconstruction of local economies, particularly in the wake of economic
restructuring which has reduced or eliminated state involvement in the provision of subsidies and
services, thus requiring a reorganization of local economies to address this change (Bebbington 1996;
Petras 1997).
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organize only amongst themselves and  only on a national level.  By the late 90s, these
three factors are already established facts and different forms of ‘cross-border, cross-
movement’ organizing have been tested. The possibility for constructive alliances
among these actors that would promote the types of changes necessary to address the
problems they set out to face is, at present, limited by the structural positions of both
organized labor and NGOs.  As the divisions between the ‘social majorities’ and the
‘social minorities’, both North and South, become increasingly dramatic,  some sectors
of the NGO world  move toward a more radical critique, which, in the context of the
alliances described below may yield promising results.
The presence of diverse groups that do not necessarily subscribe to modern
conceptions of ‘liberalism’, ‘Marxism’, ‘radical democracy’, or ‘civil society’, brings a
richness to these initiatives.  While such groups are active in these new forms of
international organizing, they are also marginalized within them: recognized as
legitimate, but kept on the fringes of the principal discussions. Thus while women,
indigenous people and other ‘others’ are invited to participate, it is usually understood
that they act as specific groups, with group-specific goals, not easily integrated into the
‘political’ and ‘economic’ issues which are almost always seen as most important and
somehow  separable from those of the ‘others’. The realities and importance of
‘diversity’ are recognized, but they are understood as the superficial differences
between individuals and groups that are easily transposed onto economic and political
systems as if these last were not structurally embedded in social systems that create and
allow for diversity.
Technological changes allowing more rapid transfer of information are one key
factor in the recent growth in the strength and capacity of these various organizations
and networks. During the 70s, 80s, and 90s a change could be observed in the solidarity
and human rights movements that used first FAX and later email, both to pass
information among themselves and as a means of putting immediate pressure on state
and interstate actors regarding concrete and urgent actions.  These technological
changes have vastly improved the possibilities for international organizing, particularly
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in situations where public outcry can have the effect of changing state policy.60 The
quick passing of information among NGOs and other organizations also  simplifies the
definition of common positions for lobbying purposes (Lins Ribiero 1998: 341).  The
new technologies speed up the availability of counterinformation which can be used to
counteract false (or the absence of) reporting in mainstream news services.
Access to  this new technology tends to reflect already existing relations of
power, both internationally and within organizations, particularly in poorer parts of the
world (Lins Ribiero 1998: 342). However, in those few contexts where all have
relatively equal access to technology61, it can make for a more horizontal sharing of
information among organizers and movement members.
At the same time, the use of email and the internet reinforces the tendencies
toward individualization within modern societies, allowing each person to take political
action from his or her home or worksite, without the need for any ‘personal’, human
interchange. This trend builds upon the already existing ‘membership organizations’
cum social movements, developed in the US and later brought to Europe, which consist
of donors who may also take on the role of ‘letter writers’ and ‘voters’. The creation of
‘social movements’ that express themselves through emails, faxes, and (every so often)
votes, is reflective of the ‘depersonalization’ of the modern world. After years of mass
movements, and calls for ‘direct democracy’ etc. it seems that capitalism and modernity
have succeeded in commodifying and rationalizing the ‘new social movements’ as well.
The use of email and internet sites as means of information exchange are
nonetheless incredibly important in the increasing use of ‘network’ forms of organizing
which are more horizontal in nature. This can mean a network of people that form a
single group or organization, or a network of groups and organizations. This type of
organizing is by no means original to the internet, and can be found in anarchist, and
more recently, Western feminist forms of organization. Nonetheless, the new
                                                
60The struggle of the EZLN in Mexico has been perhaps the best example of how local struggles have
been rapidly made into global issues through the use of email and the internet (Cleaver 1998; Lins
Ribiero 1998: 344). Another recent example of the effective use of the internet was the NGO campaign
against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) between late 1997 and mid-1998 in which
NGOs mobilised letter writing and call-in campaigns  in several of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) member countries, preventing the approval of  the Agreement by the
OECD in April of 1998 (Drohan 1998).
61 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP 1997: 185). estimated a rate of internet use in
1994 at 1.5 persons per 10,000 in ‘all developing countries’ compared with 223.2 per 10,000 in the
‘industrialized countries’.
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technologies have made it possible for groups which are highly dispersed
geographically to ‘network’ in ways that were previously impossible.
This section will look at four particular phenomena in present ‘cross-border,
cross-movement’ organizing,  each one unique, but all with trajectories which are, in
some part, common or overlapping. The Encounters and Network against Neoliberalism
and for Humanity62, NGO networks and the International Forum on Globalization
(IFG)63, the Santiago Counter-Summit64 and the People’s Global Alliance (PGA)65 all
represent moments of co-ordination/interchange by social movements in  response to
neoliberal economic restructuring.  The Encounters, the IFG and the Santiago Counter
Summit are all rooted in the Americas and can claim a common reference point in the
campaign against the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in the early
1990s. The PGA, in turn, can claim some of its own roots in the Encounters.
Encounters Against Neoliberalism and for Humanity
For one week in the summer of 1996 the First Encounter Against Neoliberalism
and for Humanity was held in Chiapas, Mexico, organized by the EZLN and attended
by about 3,000 participants, principally from Europe, Mexico and the US, with
significant representation from the rest of Latin America, and very little from the
remainder of the world.  The Second Encounter was held one year later in different
parts of the Spanish State66, with approximately 2,000 people, primarily from Europe
again, but with participants from approximately 70 nations (Simoncini 1998:167).
In addition to providing a show of international solidarity for the EZLN, the
First Encounter succeeded in creating a space for interchange between activists, and a
bit of hope in the dark days of the consolidating new world order. The first Encounter
was able to establish and strengthen ties among different groups that previously had had
little contact. It was not designed to create a new organization, but rather to allow for
discussion, disagreement and a free flow of information among participants.
                                                
62See Albertani (1997), De Angelis (1998), Lane (1997), EZLN (1996), Simoncini (1998), Piazza (1996),
Esteva & Prakesh (1998: 173-179) as well as the website at
http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/3849/gatherdx.html for more on the Encounters.
63See Lynch (1998) and Roberts (1998) as well as the website http://www.ifg.org
64Information on the Santiago Counter Summit is available at the website http://tripod.com/~redchile/
65Information on the PGA is available at the website http://www.agp.org/agp/index.html
66This was the term preferred by the organizers of the event to describe ‘Spain’.
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The discussions at the First Encounter were dominated by the West, both in
terms of participants  and in terms of content.  This was also reflected in the Latin
American presence which was primarily of European extract and worldview. The
members of the EZLN, who participated minimally in discussions, preferring to listen
(or sleep- at times),67 did little to change the overwhelmingly Western tone of the
discussions in which I participated.68  Nonetheless, the ambiance of the event was
colored by the Mayan communities that hosted the Encounter.
The organizers of the event had tried to make sure that all potential categories of
the ‘marginalized’ could have a chance to discuss their specific issues. In this sense the
Encounter was inclusive, if not always successfully, and not without a great deal of
discussion and disagreement69. Though it was organized in a ‘democratic’ manner, in
the sense that enough tables and sub-tables were arranged such that all could have a
chance to participate, many forms of exclusion were to be found within the Encounter
itself.  The Western tone of the discussions meant that those who spoke were often
those who were most willing to interrupt, while those who would politely wait their
turn never had an opportunity to express their opinions.70 Additionally, the traditional
hierarchies of power (male/female, North/South, modern/non-modern) were present,
with the obvious but nonetheless striking twist that any Mayan with a bandanna or ski
mask was treated with infinite respect, giving credence to the Zapatista slogan: ‘we
cover our faces in order to be heard’.71
The operative conclusions of the First Encounter were three: to create a
‘network against neoliberalism and for humanity’, to realize a global poll on agreement
or disagreement with the baseline ideas of the Encounter, and to organize a Second
Encounter, somewhere in Europe, the following year. The first conclusion was already
                                                
67A respectable decision given the content of many discussions.
68On a personal level, coming from my own work in the Highlands of Guatemala, I felt familiar with  the
Highlands of Chiapas and the indigenous communities. The tone and content of the discussions were
therefore striking in their limited applicability to the physical environment in which they occurred.
69The initial proposal by the organizers was to have women’s issues subsumed into a subtable that would
discuss the ‘excluded’, prompting a vociferous response from many of the women present and the
creation of an ‘unplanned’ women’s table.
70This is not a ‘universal’ form of holding a discussion and effectively eliminates many who are
unfamiliar or uncomfortable with it.
71The slogan refers to the fact that poor Mexican peasants have been making claims on the Mexican
government for decades and it was only when they rose up in arms and covered their faces with
bandannas and skimasks that the government made any pretence at listening. The fact that the same
situation is more or less repeated at the Encounter is revealing. Though, to be fair, Encounter participants
were completely respectful and interested in talking to those Mayans without bandannas as well.
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in place, the second was almost universally ignored, and the third was to prove a
burdensome task.
Over the next year, different European organizations, principally Chiapas
solidarity committees, came together to discuss the organization of the Second
Encounter. Before these meetings began, however, the solidarity movement itself
started to split, and was weakened, principally because of  differing ideas regarding the
type of relationships the solidarity committees should have with national political
parties in France, Italy and Spain, the three countries, other than Mexico, which had
sent the most participants to the First Encounter (Albertani & Ranieri 1998).
The prevailing opinion among the European organizers was that the Second
Encounter should be ‘self-organized’, meaning that no funding would be accepted from
institutional sources, with the idea that this would promote greater freedom of
expression. Among those involved in planning the Encounter, there were different ideas
of what it should have been centered around.  There were those who supported a
continued focus on Chiapas, those who wanted to emphasize the negative aspects of
the idea of ‘Europe’ as it was being promoted by the Maastricht Treaty of the European
Union, others who considered the situation of immigrants in Europe to be a priority,
and some  who, ‘going against the accusation of abstraction’, wanted to discuss new
forms of ‘social and political action’ (agire politico) (Albertani & Ranieri 1998: 20).  In
the end, the invitation to the Encounter was broad, allowing for discussion of a variety
of themes, including all of those mentioned above.
The Second Encounter itself was again heavily dominated by Europeans (at
least this time we were in Europe) and, although the theme of the Encounter was ‘A
World in Which Many Worlds Fit’, the discussion was yet more overridingly European.
One weakness in the first Encounter, the limited number of participants from outside
Europe and Latin America, was improved upon, but not enough to change the general
dynamic. The ‘traditional’ forms of doing politics and types of discussion were even
more visible than in the previous Encounter. Those who adopted these strategies
(controlling the microphone, controlling the translations, behind closed doors
negotiations to reach particular goals, etc.) had a relatively easy time of it, as many
others present not only weren’t playing by those rules, but weren’t even aware that
anyone else was. The general sense after the Encounter was one of disappointment
(mixed with appreciation that it had occurred), partially because of unrealistic
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expectations, but also because of some poor organizing decisions and the ‘traditional’
forms of politics mentioned above.
The greatest frustrations centered around very different ideas of what the
Encounter was about. While for some it was to be an encounter, a meeting, an
interchange,  for others it should have been a step, a move toward the construction of an
organization, however nebulous that might be. The Second Encounter had taken as a
general theme, to be discussed at all tables, the construction of the ‘network against
neoliberalism and for humanity’ agreed upon at the end of the First Encounter. The
ongoing discussions about this, and the eventual conclusion that the already existing
networks should continue to function, without any form of centralization or greater co-
ordination, reflected a consistent tension throughout the Encounter between those in
favor and those opposed to creating new structures.
The ‘intergalactic encounters’ (as they have been affectionately called) were, in
the end, only that. They were initiatives toward interchange, without any designs at
unification. On a political level, there is no organization, no one to be ‘included’ or ‘co-
opted’; nor is any participant responsible (morally or otherwise) for the actions of any
other. A lack of any centralized decisionmaking structure should make unified action
more difficult, but between December and February of 1998, protests against the Acteal
massacre took place in over fifty countries, made possible through the ‘network’
(Simoncini 1998: 10).
NGO networks
Over the past 20 years, NGOs have had an increasingly important role in
development work and the provision of services in humanitarian interventions, as well
as taking on the task of  advocacy/lobbying both at national and international levels,
often using networks to bring together geographically and politically diverse groups.
Because of the traditional North-South power imbalances among NGOs (Krut 1997:
esp. 13-17), reflective of the financial flows in the NGO world, many of the larger
European and US based organizations have played the principal roles in the appearance
and growth of NGO-led advocacy movements.  Many NGOs, whether  large or  small,
local or transnational, are faced with serious contradictions brought on by the changes
in roles they have undergone over the past fifteen years. The most important of these
are their greatly increased work as service providers at both international and national
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levels, filling in some of the gaps left by state withdrawal; and their increased access to
centers of decisionmaking, acting in an ‘advocacy’ role on an international level, having
gained entrance to United Nations (UN) sponsored conferences, and to the processes of
World Bank project planning and implementation (Nelson, 1996). The strength of the
NGOs in both of these areas is based on their ability to network internationally, and the
capacity to take advantage of the political space that has become open to them as a
result of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank enforced global economic
restructuring which has handed them some of the political power regarding resource
distribution that had  previously been under the control of national governments. Those
NGOs (a large number) that work in the field of ‘humanitarian intervention’
increasingly take on the responsibility of cleaning up after the inequalities and the
brutalities of the present international system.  NGOs have become a structural
necessity for many of these operations and, by acting in this role, lose the capacity to
criticize the larger processes which create the conditions favorable for ‘complex
political emergencies’ to appear.72
The different advocacy networks (environmental, women, human rights,
development-related, among others) have grown in parallel fashion over the past twenty
years, taking advantage of both increased possibilities for communication and increased
funding from private foundations, states, and supra-state bodies.  NGO networks have
expanded through contacts made during specific campaigns, as well as, particularly
during the past decade, through participation in UN conferences and the NGO fora that
have accompanied them.
The focus of the campaigns of the ‘development related’ NGO networks has
tended to be against multinational corporations or the World Bank (Nelson, 1996; Rich,
1994: esp. 107-147), the latter often organized through pressure on the US congress, a
political strategy whose long-term benefit is, at best, dubious. Although the historical
dominance of US-based NGOs at the apex of many of these networks (Nelson 1996:
608-9), particularly those focused on the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI) located in
Washington, has recently been somewhat weakened as  organizations from other parts
of the world have begun to take on lobbying roles in Washington, they still retain a
                                                
72See Chossudovsky (1997) on the relationship between restructuring and specific crises; Duffield (1997)
and Nederveen Pieterse (1997) for more on humanitarian intervention in the broader global context.
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great deal of power (Jordan & van Tuijl 1998; Nelson 1996: 616). This situation is one
of many that feeds into the generalized impression of a power imbalance between
Northern and Southern NGOs mentioned above.
The histories of the ‘development-related’ networks and the environmental
networks have at times overlapped, though the environmental network grew out of
specific campaigns which brought together advocacy NGOs working through
international channels and grassroots organizations working locally73.  ‘Development-
related’ NGOs have formed networks that draw on experiences of North-South co-
operation and have often allied with environmental NGOs in anti-World Bank
campaigns (Nelson 1996: 615). Some of the strongest internationally oriented
environmental NGOs became closely engaged with the ‘development-related’ networks
during the ‘Fifty Years is Enough’ campaign in the mid-1990s against the BWI (Nelson
1996: 615-6; Danaher 1994). The greatest limitation of the environmental network is
that as organizations move toward the mainstream of the Northern political spectrum,
where they seek greater support, they become less and less and willing to voice
substantive critiques which imply a broader analysis of the economic relationships that
promote many of the environmental problems that they would hope to address.74
During the 1970s and 80s human rights networks grew incredibly after financial
support expanded initially from North American foundations75 and was later supported
by  European NGOs.  This paralleled the high level of interest in the subject shown by
the administration of the then US president Jimmy Carter, joining its voice to that of
some Western European countries already active on these issues within the UN system.
The full importance of the fact that the Ford Foundation made human rights one of its
‘program priorities’ beginning in 1977 (Keck & Sikkink 1998: 101), at the same time
                                                
73See Keck & Sikkink (1998: Chapter 4) on environmental networks, Guha & Martínez Alier (1997) on
environmentalisms, Kolk (1996) and Rich (1994: 107-147) on the campaign against the World Bank in
the mid- 1980s, and Gale (1996) on the campaign against use of tropical timber.
74One example of this is the case of the Brazilian Amazon where during the 1980s northern NGOs, allied
with the rubber tappers and the indigenous people of Amazonia in their struggles for protected areas,
largely as a means of putting pressure on the World Bank, completely ignored the plight of the millions of
landless peasants in Brazil who are prevented from gaining access to land in the Brazilian latifundias and
who are periodically encouraged to colonize the Amazon rainforest. The inability of (most of) the
environmental movements to promote discussion on such issues prevents them from promoting
substantive changes. See Kolk (1996), Rich (1994: esp. Chap. 5).
75For insight into the history and power of the Ford, Rockefeller and Carnegie foundations both in the US
and in the rest of the world, see Berman (1983). It seems that foundation and state support for human
rights is another example of liberals recognizing the need to manage social change and thus direct change
in ways that keep the capitalist system functioning. See Wallerstein (1996) for more on this discussion.
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that Carter began to use human rights language in foreign relations, should not be
underestimated. While the Carter Administration was closely connected to the Trilateral
Commission (Center for… 1979:  52-3), the Ford Foundation was one of its funders
(Gill 1990: 264 note 37) and Foundation members have observer status with the
Commission (Gill 1990:148)76. International human rights networks have since
continued to be closely intertwined with national governments (Keck & Sikkink 1998:
102).
Though human rights organizations have had an important and positive impact
in many countries, it is important to recognize how ‘human rights’ fits into the broader
picture. In addition to being a Western construction, and being historically rooted in the
liberal political tradition of that particular part of the world, and being absolutely
compatible with continued global devastation (there is no right to eat), human rights has
been consistently manipulated by states to suit their needs. As of March 1999, it has
become legitimate for a group of states to bomb another in the defense of human rights.
Women’s networks have been primarily built upon the many contacts made at
the various UN Conferences on Women since 1975 (Chen 1995; Keck & Sikkink 1998:
169). Much funding for women’s organizations has also come from the Ford and other
foundations, primarily based in the North, resulting both in accusations from within the
Latin American movement of external dependence (Alvarez 1998: 311-5) and from
others about the existence of  unequal power relations that favor Northern NGOs (Keck
& Sikkink 1998: 183).  Amongst women’s organizations, a number of issue specific
networks have been formed internationally (Keck & Sikkink 1998: 167-170) and a great
deal of emphasis has been placed on the participation of women in the various
conferences organized by the UN during the 1990s.
The overlap between networks/movements has increased over the last decade,
both because of cross-participation in the various UN conferences and because of co-
ordination between networks during certain campaigns. One example of crossover has
been the  unification of international women’s organizing around the issue of violence
against women, tying it to the idea that ‘women’s rights are human rights’. This type of
campaign, which puts the debate within the liberal paradigm and makes it fundable by
                                                
76More recently, funding for human rights organizations in Eastern Europe and elsewhere has come from
the Soros Foundation, giving a new twist to ‘post-Fordism’.
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large US foundations, restates the ‘universality’ of the Western experience, as
expressed by ‘human rights’. In other situations such as the Ogoni struggle against Shell
Oil in Nigeria, and that of the rubber tappers and indigenous people of the Brazilian
Amazon  against continued capitalist expansion and state development programs, issues
of development, environment and human rights are all present, as are issues regarding
indigenous peoples.  These situations offer an interesting possibility for a deeper
analysis by the different NGO networks that work on these issues, an analysis which
could move toward developing political strategies which go beyond lobbying for
concessions in a specific geographical region, and which search out means of changing
the broader system.
International Forum on Globalization
In 1994, a number of advocates and activists, working in different organizations,
particularly those connected to ‘development-related’ and environmental networks,
formed the International Forum on Globalization (IFG), which traces its own roots to
the struggles against NAFTA and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
(IFG n.d.). The principal work of the Forum seems to be that of a network,
interchanging information and participating in campaigns, while it also producing its
own materials about ‘corporate rule’ and social movement organizing.  The Forum’s
understanding of ‘globalization’ is closely related to a vision of ‘corporate rule’
according to which  corporations have recently taken political power from states. In its
documents, the Forum directs itself to social movements, stating that ‘we can no longer
apply a piecemeal approach to what has become a systemic problem’ (Clarke n.d: par.
6).  The task of dismantling corporate rule requires ‘enabl(ing) social movement
activists to develop their own analyses and strategies for tackling systems of corporate
rule in their own countries and regions.’ (Clarke n.d.: par. 7).  The role of the IFG in
that particular process is to provide the tools that local organizations can use to
understand corporate rule.
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People’s Global Alliance against Free Trade and the World Trade Organization77
The People’s Global Alliance against Free Trade and the World Trade
Organization (PGA) is a broad alliance of social movements which held its first general
conference in February of 1998, to plan actions in protest of the biannual World Trade
Organization (WTO) meeting in May of the same year. The widely disparate groups
present at the first meeting, coming from 54 nations78, were similar to those present at
the Encounters described above, with the difference that the organizations present were
less likely to use violent forms of struggle, principally because one of the four guiding
principles of the PGA is non-violence. Considering the type of meeting, participation
was fairly well balanced with 22 Third World countries present, and 8 nations from
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. While the PGA draws on many sources,
including NGO networks, the Encounters against Neoliberalism and grassroots
movements from many parts of the world, it has also, since its formation, included
more conservative organizations such as the World-wide Fund for Nature (WWF)
which have more experience in bargaining with intergovernmental organizations.79
The Conference was marked by divisions among Marxists, liberals and others,
resulting in long discussions about terminology, and the ‘manifesto’ of the PGA shows
that  mix. Though the Marxist elements dominate, ‘corporate rule’, ‘patriarchy’, and
‘cultural homogenization’ are also discussed in the final document (PGA 1998).
The PGA is notably more centralized than the Encounters80 or the previous
campaigns organized by NGO led groups, and the  degree of organizational structure
was a point widely discussed during the meeting, with some groups even promoting
symbols and slogans to be adopted by the Alliance. The tension within the PGA around
the issue of centralization is an ongoing one, reflected in the difference between these
                                                
77There are no published references to the PGA. The following section is based on my personal
experiences at the first Conference of the Alliance in February of 1998, on information available at the
PGA Website http://www.agp.org/agp/index.html, and on conversations with other meeting participants
and one organizer.
78These numbers come from a list of participants distributed at the conference, and should not be
considered as exact.
79 The WWF is closely associated to the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN), one
of the most conservative environmental groups, with fifty years of experience in international lobbying
(McCormick 1993).
80The attempt at centralization can be seen in the publications produced by the different events. While the
First Encounter produced a full book which published the various conclusions of the different subtables
(EZLN 1996) and the Second, a somewhat shorter, similar  one (Simoncini 1998), the PGA Conference
produced an 11 page ‘manifesto’ which attempted to synthesize the analyses and goals of the 300
participants.
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proposals and the initial convocation of the Conference which called for the creation of
‘a global instrument of communication and co-ordination for those who fight against
the destruction of humanity and the planet by “free” trade and construct local
alternatives to globalization’ (PGA  1997). Nonetheless, in terms of discussion, the
PGA meeting was much more structured and goal oriented than the Encounters;
ideological disagreements had a different degree of importance as the results would
form part of the Alliance’s manifesto. Whereas the Encounters had been almost solely a
question of interchange, networking and discussion, the PGA meetings had those
elements plus the preplanned goals of writing a collective manifesto, planning for the
May events, and deciding on a new convenors committee. Whereas both the PGA and
the Encounters brought together organizations and individuals who usually act in a
manner more similar to the hammock that Gustavo Esteva (1987) has proposed, the
PGA has tried to create a more solid framework.
The strategies for action proposed by the PGA were to realize both local and
centralized actions against the WTO during its meeting in May 1998. This meant that
actions were held  at the site of the WTO meeting in Geneva, but also in other parts of
the world.  This type of ‘global’ centralized and decentralized actions was something
new, though it obviously built upon similar actions taken at BWI meetings as well as
the Amsterdam alternative summit of 1997, the first of a number of demonstrations
held in Europe parallel to European Union and Group of Seven (G-7) summits,
protesting the policies of these supragovernmental bodies.
The May demonstrations in Geneva were violently repressed by the Swiss
police, several participants were jailed and some internationals were expelled from the
country. A few months later, an office used by the  Alliance, as well as the homes of
several organizers, were raided and information and computers were confiscated.81
This crackdown was an effort by the Swiss government to crush a nascent organization
dedicated to non-violent protest against a supra-national institution made up of member
states supposedly representative of their populations.
Following the recommendations of Scholte (1998), who calls for the WTO to
make itself more accessible to ‘civil society organizations’, it is possible to imagine
(parts of) the PGA being pulled into a consultative role in the WTO, effectively
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allowing for NGO input into WTO policy,  along the lines of  the NGO entrance into
World Bank circles since the late 1980s, a possibility that might, in certain moments
and in certain places, cut off the sharpest edges of WTO policies without changing the
overall social dislocation that the WTO promotes.
Santiago Counter-Summit
In April of 1998 a Counter-Summit of the Americas was held in Santiago Chile,
concurrent to the Summit of the Americas for Heads of State from the western
hemisphere. As a concept, it drew on the parallel meetings held at the annual BWI
conferences, and the 1997 alternative summit in Amsterdam, while some of those at the
Counter-Summit in Santiago had also been present at the PGA Conference in Geneva.
The event could be seen as step in the creation of a ‘hemispheric social alliance’
(Bendaña 1998) between labor and other social movements begun at a 1997 meeting in
Belo Horizonte, Brazil.
The Counter-Summit, bringing together indigenous movements, women’s
groups, environmental organizations and others, was principally sponsored by the
American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and its
Latin America affiliates in  the Interamerican Regional Workers Organization (ORIT).
The presence of the labor organizations at this forum seems to be related to the fact that
labor was excluded from the formal talks on the creation of the Free Trade Agreement
of the Americas (FTAA)82, while business had been welcomed (Bendaña 1998). This
shift reflects the increasing weakness of labor organizations in relation to capital, and
may signal the recognition, from the perspective  of organized labor in the US (at least),
that  it can no longer confide in the corporatist alliances of the past and that, if it is to
continue to have any strength, it will need to create new alliances that move outside of
both national and movement boundaries.
This new tendency in labor organizing is also built upon a history of cross-
border and cross-movement efforts in the struggle against the passage of NAFTA
during the early 1990s (Gabriel & McDonald 1994).  Though the movement failed,
                                                                                                                                 
81See http://www.agp.org/agp/unicc.htm and http://www.agp.org/agp/en/index.html for more information
on police repression of the PGA in Geneva.
82This follows the Copenhagen summit of 1995 in which the International Conference of Free Trade
Unions (ICTFU) failed to get a special seat for labour with business and state negotiators and was forced
to join the parallel NGO Forum (Waterman 1998: 114).
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important connections were made which later played a key role in continued cross-
border labor organizing (Brecher & Costello 1994: 156-7) and in international support
for the EZLN after the Chiapas uprising in 1994 (Cleaver 1998: 627).
Nonetheless, the fact that First World labor organizations have suddenly become
aware of their own need to organize with Third World workers, and other movements,
should not be accepted without further analysis.83 The desires of labor as expressed in
Santiago are unclear. At the Counter-Summit, labor resisted the more radical positions,
and at the other ‘labor’ counter-summit, held contemporaneously in Santiago, leaders
were nearly united in unquestioning fealty to the rule of the market (Bendaña 1998).
Labor’s involvement in the Counter Summit can be seen as a gesture toward other
social movements and as a threat for heads of state that had excluded it from the FTAA
talks.
The Counter-Summit also involved many other groups with much more radical
agendas, and a split was visible. Though the  ‘Final Declaration’ of the Summit called
for ‘fair trade, regulated investment, and a conscious consumer strategy which
privileges national development projects’ (People’s Summit 1998: par.3), more creative
proposals were often voiced by the floor.84
Comparisons
The different initiatives described show, above all, a recognition of the
consequences produced by neoliberal global restructuring and try to offer alternatives
for the future. These are  attempts to create  broad networks/coalitions/alliances which
address (with the exception of the Encounters) both regional and global entities that
continue to gain power at the expense of national governments.  All of these efforts are
built upon previously existing networks and maintain network forms of organization,
though some elements involved with the PGA, and some of the groups involved in the
Santiago summit, are attempting to create more structured organizations.
                                                
83After the support given by the AFL-CIO to US foreign policy during the Cold War, it is hard to imagine
that their politics have shifted from corporatism to ‘class solidarity’. The AFL-CIO foreign strategy began
to change in the late 1980s after internal criticisms about their support for, and collaboration with,  US
government policies in Central America (Brecher & Costello 1994: 153; Boswell & Stevis 1997).
84The various proposals are available at http://tripod.com/~redchile
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Strategies
On the level of strategy, the IFG offers local construction of economic
alternatives and a ‘new protectionism’, while the PGA proposes more or less the same
with the addition of direct action, on the local level as well as co-ordinated
internationally, to protest corporate power, symbolized by the WTO.  The Encounters
welcome local construction as well as all forms of local resistance, violent or not, and
informal solidarity amongst all groups. The  NGO alliances have, up until now,
proposed ‘alternative development’ forms of local construction and heavy lobbying on
international decisionmakers.  The Santiago summit, internally divided, promotes local
construction, while also calling for inclusion into the FTAA. These strategies offer
strengths and weaknesses and reflect the ever present  social movement choices of
negotiation, protest or autonomous construction85.
The trend described above toward unification of the NGO led advocacy
movements and livelihood movements, as well as the increasingly confrontational
postures taken by them, has recently been alluded to by several authors. Zadek &
Gatward (1995: 199), equating  the anti-WTO protests in India and the Chiapas
rebellion, see them as ‘model[s] for one form of resistance to what [is] seen as the high
handed approach taken by TNGOs’ (Transnational Non-Governmental
Organizations).86 Though they seem to misplace the causes for grassroots frustration,
placing them  on the shoulders of unresponsive TNGOs (whose role, according to the
definition implied, would be little more than that of service providers in a global
welfare state), their comments show both a criticism toward the large Northern NGOs
and a recognition of the limitations of the strategies undertaken by many of them.87 The
increasing frustration with the present state of affairs is also mentioned by Krut (1997:
35), referring to an ‘NGO observer’ who predicts an increase in ‘“uncivil” behavior
from workers and communities directed at TNCs’ (Transnational Corporations).  The
author points to an increasing awareness among NGOs that their access to UN
                                                
85 See Waterman (1998: 212, esp. fig. 7.1b) for more on these choices.Negotiation and protest are, in the
end, the same strategy. Both seek a change in the policy or action of an adversary.
86These authors reject this form  of protest because of the risk of violence against the protesters.
87This same frustration on the part of grassroots ‘counterpart’ organizations was mentioned by a staff
member of a Dutch Cofinancing organization who said that groups they work with are appreciative of the
material aid that the organization provided, but are also asking for support in providing political solutions
to the problems that they face.
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conferences and multilateral discussions  has not provoked any substantive changes in
the conclusions brought forward at these meetings (Krut 1997: 38).
Esteva & Prakesh (1998: 29-31) make a clear distinction between the actions of
the Zapatistas and anti-WTO protests in India. In what appears to be a  reference to the
People’s Global Alliance, or similar efforts, they criticize these initiatives, commenting
that organizing ‘against the GATT or the World Bank, at their headquarters or their
jamborees, seems to be useless or counterproductive’(1998: 31) because it serves to
‘clothe the emperor’, giving legitimacy to  power by addressing it. They correctly point
out that the more resistance is focused against international actors, the more
bureaucracy is put in place by these actors  to try and co-opt/include those in
opposition88, legitimating themselves in the process89. The Zapatistas, according to
these authors, while recognizing that the issues which affect them on a local level are
global in nature, direct themselves toward  the local problem, while also appreciating
the importance of international solidarity between organizations in struggle (Esteva &
Prakesh 1998: 35-36).
Epistemological openness and movement goals
In her discussion of the International Forum on Globalization (IFG), Lynch
(1998) points out that it pulls together liberal ideas with more ‘radical’ or ‘critical
thinking’, reflecting a long term alliance in many parts of the world that has at times
been subsumed into the term ‘progressive’, but which should not be taken for granted.
This is true for the various initiatives here under discussion as well, though, as she
points out (Lynch 1998: 166), there are many other interpretations of the world,
beginning to be voiced through these different initiatives.
Understanding global restructuring, etc. as a retreat from the ideals of social
justice that modernity has promised, while ostensibly promoting  liberal democratic
                                                
88In the case of the World Bank, this has been borne out (Nelson 1996), and the case of the WTO, that is
at least one of the suggestions being proposed (Scholte 1998). It should be noted that in the case of the
PGA, protest has been responded to, thus far, with repression, rather than offers of ‘inclusion’ in WTO
processes (Thanks to Micheline Beth Levy for pointing this out).
89 Krut (1997: 50) points out the following:  ‘It is ironic that the late twentieth century has seen the
unprecedented growth and influence of civil society and unprecedented decline of those national and
intergovernmental organizations most open to participation.  Having spent five decades lobbying at the
gates of the United Nations, non-governmental groups have finally been granted access only to see that
real power now lies behind other doors.’
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forms of government, makes it possible to understand shifts in old alliances as well as
the appearance of new actors.  In this context, the openness of labor toward other social
movements, as it was in the NAFTA battles and seems to be in the Santiago counter-
Summit, becomes clear. The shift by ‘liberal progressives’ toward the  unusual position
that that ‘corporations [read capital] rule[s]  the world’90 is a recognition that liberal
democracy has failed to control capitalism, and explains their new openness to
discussions which open onto the economic terrain.  These shifts are coupled with
increasing grassroots initiatives which do not share modern interpretations, though their
struggles may be similar, or parallel, to more ‘modern’ movements.
One principal dividing point regarding the goals of the various initiatives
discussed above, is whether new global or regional economic structures (WTO, MAI,
FTAA, Maastricht), presently in effect or proposed, are reformable, or whether they
should be rejected. While all the groups promote increased local political and economic
control, there is a plethora of opinions about what type of alternatives can be imagined
that move beyond the local. Imagining such structures is especially difficult for those
groups which are dependent on the global or regional structures as they stand, and
somewhat easier for those who stand on the edges or outside of them.
For this reason, those NGOs (Northern or Southern) which are largely
dependent on funding by a State (their own or another) are less likely to promote
alternatives which could imply an end to such funding. In the same respect, trade unions
will have more difficulty in considering systemic changes that would imply moving
away from a consumer society. In differing degrees, both of these groups have positions
which are deeply embedded in the existing system.  The projects of both of these
groups91 are largely (though not solely) to complete modernity. They propose (or at
least accept) the changes to  modernity that would be necessary to make it more
inclusive and more responsible about environmental issues, but they are probably not
likely to support a platform that could threaten them politically or that would call into
question some of epistemological foundations upon which their positions are
constructed.
                                                
90Witness David Korten’s testimony (1995: 1-14)
91The case of the NGOs is extremely varied, but those which wield most power and funding maintain this
goal. This is not to say that there are not many other NGOs, large and small, that recognize and work to
support alternative epistemological frameworks. See Verholst (1990) and Lynch (1998: 166-7) regarding
openness to other systems of belief
65
The problem of what I term ‘epistemological openness’ in terms of cross-
cultural dialogue92, or even international organizing  has been written about by many93
and what seems to be occurring now is that discussion of these issues is taking place at
the level of international organizing among many different types of groups, from
grassroots movements to international NGOs (Lynch, 1998: 166). During almost all of
these interchanges, the ‘epistemological hegemony’ of modernity still delimits most of
the debate, and largely excludes alternative perspectives which do not fit into the
modern cosmovision. This was brought to the fore at the indigenous table of the PGA
conference in which several indigenous activists complained about the fact that they
were not integrated into the other tables, but were isolated. This implied that their
perspective was added to the broader discussions as that of a specific group (as were the
women, the students, etc.) and that their input into the ‘manifesto’, and into the
conference as a whole, could not question the modern assumptions which underlined
the whole conference. This same procedure seems to have occurred in the Santiago
counter-summit and was largely the case at both Encounters. As long as women are
talking about ‘women’s issues’ and indigenous people are talking about ‘indigenous
issues’, their opinions, and epistemological viewpoints, will remain outside of, or
tangential to, the central discussions.
This lack of interchange between modern and non-modern perspectives is
negative, both because it effectively eliminates some voices from the discussion and
because it  reduces the possibilities of creating new visions for the future that don’t all
emanate from the West, or re-interpretations of the same. Unlike the modern West,
most peoples of the world have been forced to integrate Western, modern ideas into
their own understandings of the world. The West, on the other hand, wielding the
epistemological  power that it does, has not been forced to take into account any others,
and only now is beginning to listen to other voices. If these voices can be heard in the
context of protest/construction proposed by the various initiatives discussed in this
                                                
92The relevance of other epistemologies regarding environmental practices is discussed in Redclift (1987:
151-2);  regarding present ‘social tension’ in the world, in Truong (1998);  regarding development and
social struggles, in Verholst (1987: 43-51, 79-88 et passim).  See Tully (1995) on constitutional law.
93See Esteva (1998), Cox (1992: 41), Waterman (1998: Chapter 7). For feminist discussions of solidarity
along these lines see Fraser (1989; 1997) and Dean (1997).Cecilia Lynch (1998: 166) has pointed out that
‘practice is preceding theory in this domain’ in reference to the NGO linkages and unofficial fora at UN
conferences in which  ‘Activists themselves struggle to cope with the resulting confrontation of practices
and beliefs.’
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section, the possibilities for more creative forms of resistance, and visions of the future,
will be broadened.
6. CONCLUSIONS: EPISTEMOLOGIES, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE
The efforts of the various initiatives described in the last section represent a
rejection of neoliberal policies and another step in a trajectory of new forms of
international organizing. They are also beginning to confront, within themselves,  a
challenge which most social movement theories and Western social science is still far
from willing to accept: the question of different knowledge bases, ‘epistemologies’, as
legitimate means of understanding and interpreting the world.
The implications of what is occurring on the ground, in these spaces of
encounter and organization, also question the epistemological frameworks within which
social sciences operate. If the other frameworks are not only objects of analysis for
anthropologists and students of comparative religion, what  interpretations of reality do
they provide as subjects?  If ‘acquisition as the purpose of [...] life...is foreign to all
peoples not under capitalist influence’94, how do these ‘peoples’ analyze modernity? Do
they offer alternatives?
There are three reasons why  ‘cross-border cross-movement’  initiatives and the
EZLN  are important for further study and need to be addressed by social scientists.
Firstly, they are important because they represent  popular responses to capitalist power
as it is expressed through global restructuring. Secondly, they show attempts at
alliances which seek to negotiate, and perhaps bridge, epistemological boundaries.
Lastly, because one of the epistemologies whose boundaries are being negotiated is that
of the ‘modern’ social scientist, they challenge the foundations upon which the study
itself is constructed.
At the first level of analysis, an initial study of the ‘cross-border, cross-
movement’ efforts presents a number of important conclusions. Their very existence
represents recognition on the part of local movements of the global nature of the
problems they confront. These different initiatives have expanded (primarily) network
                                                
94Weber (1920-1 v. 1:44) cited in Giddens (1971: 126)
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forms of organizing into international arenas and have made efforts to be extremely
open toward coordination and interchange among many different types of movements.
Because they  come from different ideological perspectives, their differences
may well result in splits over the next years though it is also possible that a middle
ground could be found or that the organizations regroup in diverse ways. The strategies
that they use are also  mixed, but it is clear that the lobbying efforts of the large NGOs
are not bearing sufficient fruits and more radical forms of action are being undertaken.
This too is a trend that not all actors will support and may result in fragmentation.
Perhaps the biggest problem for groups such as the PGA and the IFG is that they
can easily be brought in to ‘participate’ in IFI fora, along the lines of the NGO
participation with the World Bank and in the process give legitimization to those
institutions. The risk, on the other hand, in regard to large labor organizations is that
they may be fighting only for a return to a tripartite corporatist form of government
which, particularly in countries where many people are outside of the formal economy,
may ignore large sectors of the population.  The Encounters against Neoliberalism risk
dying a silent death if  their focus cannot be moved beyond providing support for the
EZLN and supplying political capital for other parties and movements.
At the second level, that of organizing across epistemological boundaries, these
‘cross-border cross-movement’ alliances are beginning to recognize  the issue, but as of
yet they fail to address it with any depth. Though organizers are careful to invite
everyone, events are organized so that conversations about ‘economics’ or ‘politics’ are
separated from the ‘women’s table ’ or ‘indigenous peoples table’.  The underlying
assumption is that while women, indigenous people, people of color etc. are all
negatively affected by global restructuring, they do not have valid input about what
future forms of ‘politics’ or ‘economics’ could look like.
It is at this level that the experience of the EZLN is relevant to these initiatives.
The experience within that  organization of the ‘modern left’ confronted with and
accepting the Mayan cosmovisión shows an uncommon degree of humility from that
quarter.95  This begs the question of whether the experience may be repeated in other
                                                
95See Holloway (1997), von Werlhof (1997), Rabasa (1997), and Marcos & Le Bot (1996: esp. 126-131).
Marcos describes the encounter between the EZLN and the Mayan communities in the following way: the
EZLN ‘still in the Marxist-Leninist tradition, suddenly discovers that there is a reality that it cannot
explain, about which it cannot communicate,  and with which it has to work’ (Marcos & Le Bot 1996:
131).
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specific local situations and  how ‘cross-border, cross-movement’ organizing will
respond to this reality that is now internal to its initiatives.
The most important contribution made by the  EZLN has been its open
challenging of the modern epistemology through its political actions and public
statements. Though much of what they say could also be stated within a modern
framework, the EZLN makes a specific point of declaring not only their indigenous
identity, but also the specificity of their cosmovisión. As of yet, the cross-border
initiatives mentioned above are not yet able to recognize and come to terms with
epistemological difference. This is limiting both for those who are prevented from
speaking and for those who are not permitted to hear.
This is a problem not only for movement organizers, but also for students of
social movements and other social scientists. In this study, it is possible to accept the
rallying cries against neoliberal globalization common to the different initiatives
discussed above. What is more difficult to grasp is the possible alternative futures that
the various groups involved in these initiatives may present, and to understand how
they are interpreted by the groups themselves. The fact that the struggle is against
capitalism does not mean that the response to it must be socialism; as in the case of the
Zapatistas, the capitalist-socialist debate, forming part of the modern epistemology, is
often foreign.
This leaves the social scientist in the position of recognizing an alternative
epistemology96, but few reference points as to how this can be adequately interpreted.
One solution is to make the movement an  ‘object’ of study without engaging the
epistemology within which it operates. To reject that choice means to invalidate claims
of epistemological difference, but to accept it challenges modern universals. By
questioning those universals, social science would be able to use its own position of
intellectual legitimator within modernity to undermine it.  Given the role of modernity
and modernization  in providing an alibi for capitalist expansion and Western
hegemony, such a path provides a way forward.
Regarding social movements, this would involve studying them through their
own perceptions of themselves and their own interpretations. This means neither taking
those impressions at face value nor taking them home to study without further contact
                                                
96See Emilio Rabasa (1997) for more on  this argument.
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between the student and the movement. It implies that the student enter into an
interchange with the movements themselves, to the degree that they would permit it.
The purpose of the study would therefore not be to enlighten academic understanding,
but to strengthen the movements themselves.
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